2022 മേയ് 27, വെള്ളിയാഴ്ച
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-bar-council-of-india-contempt-petition-detailed-reply-one-year-receipt-200201
2022 മേയ് 25, ബുധനാഴ്ച
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/allahabad-high-court-quash-complaint-the-wire-siddharth-varadarajan-ismat-ara-republic-day-incidents-200071
The Allahabad High Court has quashed the FIR registered against The Wire's founding editor Siddharth Varadarajan and reporter Ismat Ara in Rampur over a report on the death of a protester in New Delhi during the farmers protest on Republic Day 2021.
The FIR was lodged under IPC sections 153B (imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration) and 505(2) (statements creating or promoting enmity between classes) for tweets of the report on Navreet Singh Dibdibiya (farm law protestor who died during the protest in Delhi) and alleging that they misled the public.
The Court noted that the report was giving the version of the family of the victim that he had died of bullet injuries. The Rampur police lodged the FIR alleging that the petitioners by publication of the report and the tweets sought to "provocate the masses, spread riot, tarnish the image of medical officers by proving wrong to the panel of Medical Officers".
While quashing the FIR, a division bench comprising Justices Ashwani Kumar Mishra and Rajnish Kumar held :
"Perusal of the publication made by the petitioners indicate that it mentions the fact of incident,thereafter the statement of the family members regarding incident and alleged information given by the doctors, denial of the U.P. Police and the fact as to what happened that day. This publication was made on 30.01.2021 at 10.08 A.M. and on the very same day a clarification of the three doctors was issued by Rampur Police at 04:39 PM, immediately thereafter at 04:46 PM, the same was also published by the petitioners.
The aforesaid news items does not disclose that any opinion was expressed by the petitioners with consequences thereof, therefore this Court does not find any opinion or assertion on the part of the petitioners which may have the effect of provocating or inciting the people.
Nothing was also brought before this court to indicate that there was any disturbance or riot which may have any bearing on public disorder on account of the publication of news/ tweet of the petitioners."
Reliance is placed on Supreme Court's decision in Patricia Mukhim Vs. State of Meghalaya and Others; 2021 SCC Online SC 258, where it was held that only where the written or spoken words have the tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affecting public tranquillity, the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity.
The Bench stated that for constituting an offence against a person under Section 153-B IPC there should be words either spoken or written or signs or visible representations by a person on account of which any class of persons can not by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to the constitution of India or uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India or on account of various factors mentioned therein be denied or deprived of their rights as citizens of India or such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill will between such members and other persons
Background of the Case
In the story (written by Ismat Ara) tweeted by the petitioners, it was claimed that the grandfather of the protestor, Hardeep Singh Dibdibiya had said that he was told by one of the doctors from the panel of doctors who conducted the post-mortem that the youth had died due to a bullet injury and since his (doctor's) hands were tied, he could not do anything.
However, later on, the Rampur police had tweeted a statement saying that the doctors involved in Navreet Singh's post-mortem had denied the fact that they had spoken "to the media or any other person" or had provided any such information as is being attributed to them in the media.
Further, an FIR was registered on the complaint of a Rampur resident, Sanju Turaiha. In his complaint, he had claimed that The Wire quoted the doctor to mislead people and this article had led to anger among the common people in Rampur and had given rise to tension.
It may be noted that the Supreme Court had, in September 2021, asked 'The Wire' and three of its reporters to approach the High Court for quashing the FIR registered against them over news reports published/written by them (including the instant article tweeted by Siddharth Varadarajan and Ara).
It may be noted that Allahabad High Court, while granting them the protection from coercive action, also took into account the September 8, 2021 order of the Supreme Court in which two months of protection was granted to the "The Wire" and three of its reporters from three FIRs registered against them by the Uttar Pradesh Police over some of the reports published by the portal.
However, the Supreme Court said that entertaining the matter directly will open a "Pandora's Box" and asked them to approach the High Court for quashing the FIRs.
"We are aware of fundamental rights and don't want freedom of the press to be muzzled", the presiding judge Justice L Nageswara Rao had said, while adding that the journalists should have approached the High Court first than coming to the Supreme Court directly.
Case title - Siddharth Varadarajan And Another v. State Of U.P. And 2 Others
Click Here To Read/Download Order
The executive seems more fragile than hurt sentiment. There seems to be an increased use of Section 153A IPC and Section 295A IPC, going by data and anecdotal evidence
In yet another brute show of power, Dr. Ratan Lal, a Dalit academician, was arrested for an ‘objectionable’ post on the Gyanvapi mosque row. He is alleged to have promoted disharmony or enmity between religious groups (Section 153A in the Indian Penal Code) and intentionally and maliciously hurt religious sentiments (Section 295A in the IPC). His arrest adds to the trend of increased use of the two provisions.
The latest annual report of the National Crime Records Bureau records more than four jumps (458%) of cases registered under Section 153A since 2014; it almost doubled in the last two years. This does not necessarily mean hurtful comments surged all of a sudden, as conviction could only be secured in merely 20.4% of cases. Though no separate data is available on Section 295A, anecdotal evidence suggests its increased use by the executive.
Legislative history
The increased use of these penal provisions draws our attention to the circumstances in which they were enacted. In 1927, when Section 153A was already in existence, Section 295A was brought on the demand of a religious minority community which alleged that a pamphlet titled ‘Rangeela Rasul’ published objectionable content against its founder.
The Legislative Assembly debates at the introduction of Section 295A expressed concern about its subjectivity that could be misused. The rationale behind the provision was to deal with intentional insults to religion or outraging religious feelings. At best, the Assembly members found it a temporary remedy for a temporary aberration, not one that would be in active use a century later.
A more direct measure was incorporated through Section 295A, which would not require proving that the speech promoted enmity or hatred between classes; now, a hurt sentiment would be enough. It can be argued that it safeguarded the spirit of tolerance amidst religious diversity. But its enhanced misuse raises the question: safeguard for who and against what?
The debates sensed and cautioned against a looming threat over free speech. It was anticipated that it could be misused to suppress honest, candid, and bona fide criticism, and hinder historical research towards social reform. If individuals were allowed to register complaints about a hurt religious sentiment, the courts would be flooded with frivolous cases. Then there would be a sweeping class of offences, where it cannot be objectively adjudicated if a crime has been committed.

Shrutika & Mayank Yadav

Getty Images/iStockphoto
In yet another brute show of power, Dr. Ratan Lal, a Dalit academician, was arrested for an ‘objectionable’ post on the Gyanvapi mosque row. He is alleged to have promoted disharmony or enmity between religious groups (Section 153A in the Indian Penal Code) and intentionally and maliciously hurt religious sentiments (Section 295A in the IPC). His arrest adds to the trend of increased use of the two provisions.
The latest annual report of the National Crime Records Bureau records more than four jumps (458%) of cases registered under Section 153A since 2014; it almost doubled in the last two years. This does not necessarily mean hurtful comments surged all of a sudden, as conviction could only be secured in merely 20.4% of cases. Though no separate data is available on Section 295A, anecdotal evidence suggests its increased use by the executive.
Legislative history
The increased use of these penal provisions draws our attention to the circumstances in which they were enacted. In 1927, when Section 153A was already in existence, Section 295A was brought on the demand of a religious minority community which alleged that a pamphlet titled ‘Rangeela Rasul’ published objectionable content against its founder.
The Legislative Assembly debates at the introduction of Section 295A expressed concern about its subjectivity that could be misused. The rationale behind the provision was to deal with intentional insults to religion or outraging religious feelings. At best, the Assembly members found it a temporary remedy for a temporary aberration, not one that would be in active use a century later.
A more direct measure was incorporated through Section 295A, which would not require proving that the speech promoted enmity or hatred between classes; now, a hurt sentiment would be enough. It can be argued that it safeguarded the spirit of tolerance amidst religious diversity. But its enhanced misuse raises the question: safeguard for who and against what?
The debates sensed and cautioned against a looming threat over free speech. It was anticipated that it could be misused to suppress honest, candid, and bona fide criticism, and hinder historical research towards social reform. If individuals were allowed to register complaints about a hurt religious sentiment, the courts would be flooded with frivolous cases. Then there would be a sweeping class of offences, where it cannot be objectively adjudicated if a crime has been committed.
Some safeguards
However, there were statutory safeguards that required deliberate intention and malice; and judicial rulings that needed looking at — words used, intent, and effect to ascertain criminality. Only a deliberate and aggravated form of religious insult would attract the rigor of the provision.
The judiciary laid down two ways to measure the effect — one by establishing a link between speech and public disorder, and by measuring the effects from the standards of a reasonable man, and not from one who fears all hostile viewpoints. However, no attempt was made to translate the safeguards into practice, which could have shielded the dear ethos of free speech. A half-hearted attempt left us with a law that cannot be enforced appropriately and is being let loose to chase the dissenter.
Element of subjectivity
Unlike bodily harm that can be verified, sentimental hurt cannot be tested against strict measures. The element of subjectivity overrides it as a sentiment’s vulnerability could widely vary, even among those of the same religion.
A critical inquiry of orthodox practices and superstitious beliefs encourages social reforms. The need for an intelligent counter is required much more amid the aggressive assertion of religious beliefs by the socio-political hegemon. Even the 1927 Joint Select Committee appreciated the argument that a religious insult inflicted in good faith, with the object of steering reform, would bring the follower’s required attention to the critique.
India’s Constitution celebrates diversity with the guarantee of free speech. With that aspirational pledge, should not the answer to hurt religious sentiment be tolerance, and not rampant criminalisation? This may be an unreal expectation in times of widespread hate and disharmony. It is anomalous for a pluralistic, democratic, and secular nation that runs on counter-discourses to criminalise speech for hurting fickle religious sentiments.
Even the statutory safeguards of ‘deliberate intention and malice’ cannot be objectively determined. The police do not get into the legislative nuances before registering a criminal case or making an arrest. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum critiqued the law by saying that it invites thugs to suppress speech on anything they dislike; she added that given India’s political climate, several would take up this ugly invitation. A hazy legal paradigm criminalising hurting religious sentiment facilitates the ruling dispensation’s strategy to stifle all dissent and use the law to fuel divisive politics.
On raging criminalisation of free speech, senior advocate Indira Jaising said that repeated use of law to stifle dissent reflects state policy. “It is not a ‘misuse’; it is being used the way the enforcement agencies want it,” she added. The executive is seemingly more fragile than a citizen’s hurt religious sentiment. It sends out a clear message that be it a stand-up comic script, a remark on the belief of walking barefooted in reverence, or taking beef to school, India is no longer the country to hold and express opinions challenging the state-backed majoritarian rhetoric.
Shrutika is an independent researcher pursuing Master of Laws (LLM) from the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) Mumbai. Mayank Yadav is a Delhi-based lawyer. The views expressed are personal
https://epaper.thehindu.com/Home/MShareArticle?OrgId=GTV9RMDKU.1&imageview=0
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/qutub-minar-temple-restoration-judgment-reserved-delhi-court-199952
The Saket District Court in Delhi has reserved its order on the appeals preferred against a Civil Judge order dismissing the suit which alleged that the Quwwat-Ul-Islam Masjid situated within Qutub Minar Complex was built in place of a temple complex and sought restoration of the same.
Additional District Judge Nikhil Chopra has kept the matter for pronouncement on june 9.
"Arguments concluded. Parties would be at liberty to file brief synopsis if any within a week, with advance copy to the opposite party. List on June 9 for orders," the Judge recorded in the order.
In the original suit, the plaintiffs alleged that around 27 Hindu and Jain temples were desecrated and damaged raising the construction of the said Mosque in place of those temples.
The civil judge had rejected the suit after noting that the suit was barred by the provisions of the Places of Worship Act 1991 and rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of Civil Procedure Code for non-disclosure of cause of action.
The Civil judge had also observed that the wrongs of the past cannot be a basis for disturbing the present peace and that if it's allowed, fabric of constitution, secular character will be damaged.
Is right to worship a fundamental or legal right?
In appeal, seeking restoration of deities and permission to resume worship, Hari Shankar Jain, one of the appellants, submitted,
"It is the admitted position is for the last 800 years, it wasn't used by the Muslims. When there is a temple which was in existence much before the mosque, why it can't be restored?"
He referred to Section 16 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (AMASR Act) which provides for protection of place of worship from misuse, pollution or desecration. Jain also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in the Ayodhya Temple case to contend that once a deity, is always a deity and a temple, merely on being demolished, shall not lose its character, sanctity or dignity.
"I am a worshipper. There are images still existing, still visible…If the deity survives, right to worship survives."
However, the Court inquired as to what is the legal right which entitles the appellants. It stated that the existence of idol is not in dispute. However, the question is regarding right to worship.
"The question is, whether right to worship is an established right, whether it's a constitutional or any other right? The only question is whether there is any denial of any legal right to the appellant? And what all remedies if any are available with respect to this right?
Even if assuming there was an admission that it was demolished, structure was raised, assuming it wasn't used by Muslims as mosque, question which is more important is can you now claim it to be restored on what basis?
Now you want this monument to be turned into a temple calling it restoration, my question is how would you claim that the plaintiffs have a legal right assuming it existed about 800 years back? On a lighter note, Deity is survived for last 800 years without worship. Let him survive like that."
Jain contended that the impugned order denies the Constitutional and fundamental right of Hindu community under Article 25 of the Constitution.
The Court then asked if there is any precedent in law which identifies "right to worship" as fundamental right?
Jain responded,
"In Ayodhya judgment, it's held that a deity survives, it's never lost. If that, then my right to worship survives."
He asked the Court to consider whether there can be mosque after demolition of a temple and whether it will be considered as a mosque.
Does Section 16 of AMASR Act bar restoration of temples?
The Court suggested that the impugned order of the Civil Judge seems to have made findings on the point that granting of relief to the plaintiffs may upset or be in violation of the statute (AMASR Act).
It added that Section 16 of the AMASR Act seems to be on same principle as Section 3 of Places of Worship Act, which bars conversion of places of worship.
Section 16(1) of AMASR Act states that a protected monument maintained by the Central Government under this Act which is a place of worship or shrine shall not be used for any purpose inconsistent with its character.
Section 16(2) provides that where the Central Government has acquired a protected monument which is used for religious worship or observances by any community, the Collector shall make due provision for the protection of such monument or part thereof, from pollution or desecration.
However, Jain contended that Section 16 is completely in deviation of what is said in Section 3 of Places of Worship Act.
"Every monument governed by Monument Act is exempted from application of Places of Worship Act. Nobody can dispute this. My test is on exclusion. When Act exempts the application of Places of Worship Act, how the suit is dismissed on this basis?"
Submissions by ASI
The Archaeological Survey of India has admitted in its counter affidavit that there are a number of sculptures existing within the Qutab Minar Complex, including images of Lord Ganesha.
However, it submitted that there is no provision under AMASR Act 1958 under which Worship can be started at any living monument and thus, no decree of permanent injunction as prayed for can be passed changing the existing structure of the structure.
Advocate Subhash Gupta, appearing for the body, submitted that there are no grounds for interfering with the judgment of the court below.
"Character of a place is determined on the date when monument comes under purview of 1958 Act. The character once frozen as that in the monument cannot be changed," he said.
Gupta explained that when a monument comes under ASI under 1958 Act, there is period of objections for 60 days. And it is for this reason, there are several monuments in country which are places of worship and several other monuments, which are not.
He stated that the 1991 Act is to protect places of worship from their conversion. Whereas the 1958 Act is for the protection and preservation, maintenance of monuments.
"Yes, fundamental right exists but it's not absolute and therefore court has found that this right is not available in this case. Learned court applied its judicial mind," he said while referring to the impugned order.
Gupta further informed the Court that even though the mosque was built on remains of 27 temples, however, it is not clear as to whether the material for construction of mosque was retrieved by demolition of temples or whether the same was sourced from outside.
Does Places of Worship Act apply to Qutub Minar?
Another interesting question before the case in this case is whether apart from the AMASR Act, the Places of Worship Act apply to the monument.
The Civil Judge in the impugned order had held that the suit was barred by the provisions of the Places of Worship Act.
The appellants on the other hand claim that Section 4(3)(a) of the Places of Worship Act, 1991 excludes an ancient and historical monument or an archaeological site from its purview.
The District Judge was of the view that the same can be decided by determining the character of the structure.
"You (ASI) say it's a monument without worship and as such it should continue like that. They (Appellants) say it's a temple, pre-existing and suppose this is a situation, fact v. fact, can it be decided under Order 7 Rule 11?" the Court said.
Case Title: Tirthankar Lord Rishabh Dev through next friend Hari Shankar Jain v. Union of India
(Compiled and Edited by Akshita Saxena)
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/indira-jaising-marital-rape-it-rules-gender-sensitisation-senior-designation-200004
In a recent conversation, Senior Advocate Indira Jaising voiced her opinion on, inter alia, the split verdict of the Delhi High Court on marital rape, the 2021 IT Rules for Intermediaries and Digital Media, senior designations by High Courts.
The following are excerpts from the discussion as it transpired on the online show 'Behind the Bar'-
Ms. Jaising: "I just handled a case in the Supreme Court of India three days ago where a district court in Karnataka had framed charges for rape at the instance of the wife against the husband. It was a huge step forward. It was challenged in the High Court by the husband. The High Court gave a very interesting judgment upholding the framing of the charge. Of course, the husband came to the Supreme Court and it came before the bench of the learned Chief Justice N. V. Ramana and Justices Suryakant and Hima Kohli. While they agreed to hear the case, they refused to stay the framing of charges. It becomes the first case in the country where on the complaint of the wife, a husband will be prosecuted for rape. Why is it a significant judgment? Because it recognises that the wife can complain about unwanted sex from your husband. The case succeeded because this was not a public interest petition, she was a real woman in a real situation who came to court and said that this is what my husband does to me. She described some acts which would amount to forcible sex, forcible anal sex, forcible oral sex. She invoked 376 and 377 (of the IPC) and the charges are framed for both. It is interesting because in my opinion, it demolishes the entire theory set up more than three centuries ago based on English common law that by marriage, a woman gives up her right to bodily autonomy. It is said that the common law of England was that, by virtue of marriage, she consented to have sex with her husband. I have never been able to understand that. The word 'Marital Rape' does not appear anywhere in the IPC. The question I am raising is that let us assume that a woman consents on marriage to have sex, that is stating the obvious, but the question is does she consent to violent sex? All force is violence. Does she consent to brutal sex? In the facts of this case, the judge records that the wife complained that she was treated like a sex slave. Here, the court distinguishes between theory and practice. In practice, the woman was treated brutally and violently, and I take the view that regardless of the exception, no woman consents to this form of sex"
Video Courtesy : SILF
