supreme-court-maharashtra-shiv-sena-split-eknath-shinde-uddhav-thackeray-sc-asks-shouldnt-political-parties-abide-by-democratic-principles-544693

In the Shiv Sena matter, the Supreme Court today asked the Uddhav Thackeray faction if political parties are not supposed to abide by democratic principles the way constitutional institutions do.

"Your party constitution was based on democratic principles. And then you suddenly brought an amendment and created a complete...When we talk of democratic principles in institutions, a question would arise - as a political party, are you also not supposed to follow the principles?" the Chief Justice of India questioned.

In response, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, for the Uddhav faction, contended that there is a difference between institutions that discharge political functions and institutions that discharge constitutional functions. He said that while an erroneous political function can be corrected, a wrong decision by a constitutional authority like ECI can seldom be rectified. The senior counsel further underlined that the level of integrity expected from institutions discharging constitutional functions is way higher.

"Institutional integrity is at the heart of a democracy. Defection is a constitutional sin. [But] Now, it is a badge of honor. Already, enough powers have been given to ECI. Give another power (to go into validity of party constitution and ignore them) and see what happens", Sibal commented.

The exchange was in the context of Sibal questioning the ECI's refusal to accept Shiv Sena's Constitution on the ground that it did not provide for internal democracy.

The bench of CJI Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana was dealing with the plea filed by Uddhav Thackeray faction member Sunil Prabhu challenging the Maharashtra Speaker's refusal to disqualify MLAs of the Eknath Shinde faction under the 10th Schedule. Another petition, filed by Uddhav Thackeray, was also listed before the bench, which challenges the ECI decision that recognized the Eknath Shinde faction as the official Shiv Sena and allowed it the use of the 'bow and arrow' symbol.

Yesterday, Justice Bagchi had orally observed, on the strength of the Constitution Bench decision in Subhash Desai, that a political party has subsisting control over a legislature party and any decision of the political party would prevail over the will of the majority of the legislature party. 

Today, Sibal contended inter-alia that the ECI had no jurisdiction to question the 2018 party constitution and it erred in "assuming the jurisdiction" and ignoring the constitution while holding in favor of the Shinde faction. In this regard, Sibal relied on a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court, as per which the ECI does not have adjudicatory power with regard to a party's constitution.

"Maximum power they have is of withdrawing recognition. But they assume jurisdiction and decide the matter on the basis of that. This is most unfair. If institutions don't inspire confidence, this is what happens", he averred. 

Sibal further claimed that the Uddhav faction was left in a lurch because the disqualification issue was not timely decided. He recalled that he had urged before the Constitution bench as well that ECI should first decide the disqualification issue, not the election symbol issue, but the plea was rejected.

Justice Bagchi, in response, noted that there were overlapping facts in both issues, but the tests employed by the Speaker (on the disqualification issue) and the ECI (to decide the election symbol issue) differed.

From the Subhash Desai case, the judge observed that voluntarily giving up membership of a party was held not to automatically amount as severance of ties with the party. It was also noted that the Speaker decided the issues on the basis of actions of the Eknath Shinde faction, such as moving of the 31 MLAs to Surat and their not attending party meetings despite notice.

When Sibal highlighted that there were other anti-party activities as well, such as the MLAs' passing of own resolution appointing Eknath Shinde as group leader and Bharat Gogawale as Chief Whip, Justice Bagchi noted that those events took place "after" the filing of disqualification petitions. Sibal however argued that the same did not matter, especially as the Constitution Bench held those actions to be illegal. Differing, Justice Bagchi said that the date did matter and the Constitution Bench did not decide on disqualification. The judge further referred to the Sharad Yadav case, where it was held that the date of filing of disqualification petition would be relevant.

Subsequently, Sibal argued that under law (Section 29A of RP Act), there is no requirement for a party to place on record of the ECI its amended Constitution. He said that only the original constitution is to be placed on record before the ECI, while any subsequent amendments are only to be intimated. Even so, he maintained that in the present case, the 2018 constitution was sent to the poll body along with the Uddhav faction's letter (although the same is denied by ECI).

Sibal also lamented the manner in which the Shinde faction came to power. He highlighted that the ECI disregarded the political party's organizational structure, the Speaker kept the disqualification petitions pending, the facts of the case were covered by precedents, yet the party's symbol was allotted to Shinde faction and virtually everything taken away from the political party. It was stressed that the Shinde government should not have been allowed to be formed.

The senior counsel also remarked that people in power are like a magnet. He underlined that in Shiv Sena's case, initially 31 MLAs defected then the number rose to 39. Certain MPs as well, who were with the Uddhav faction, shifted sides after Shinde became Chief Minister. So to keep disqualification petitions "lingering" is wrong.

Another contention of the Uddhav faction was that the Election Symbols Order does not recognize the concept of a legislature party. On facts, it was also highlighted that both sides had filed their affidavits before the ECI to show the support they enjoyed in the legislative and organizational wings. The Uddhav faction had an overwhelming majority in the organizational wing. Hence, the ECI found it "convenient" to ignore the 2018 constitution and the organizational structure.

Appearance: Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal and Devadatt Kamat (for Uddhav faction); Senior Advocates Neeraj Kishan Kaul and Maninder Singh (for respondents)

Case : Sunil Prabhu v. Eknath Shinde SLP(C) No. 1644-1662/2024 (and connected case)

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-maharashtra-shiv-sena-split-eknath-shinde-uddhav-thackeray-sc-asks-shouldnt-political-parties-abide-by-democratic-principles-544693

In the Shiv Sena dispute, the Supreme Court today orally said that as per existing law, a political party has subsisting control over a legislature party and any decision of the political party would prevail over the will of the majority of the legislature party.

A bench of CJI Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana was hearing the plea filed by Uddhav Thackeray faction member Sunil Prabhu challenging the Maharashtra Speaker's refusal to disqualify MLAs of the Eknath Shinde faction under the 10th Schedule. Another petition, filed by Uddhav Thackeray, was also listed before the bench, which challenges the ECI decision that recognized the Eknath Shinde faction as the official Shiv Sena and allowed it the use of the 'bow and arrow' symbol.

During the hearing, Justice Bagchi observed :

"Law as it stands is Subash Desai. The control of the political party subsists over the legislature party. Any decision of the political party, validly demonstrated, must prevail over any will, even if of the majority of the legislature party."

The judge was recapitulating the legal position laid down in Subhash Desai v. Government of Maharashtra, where a Constitution Bench of the Court held that the Maharashtra Governor's decision to call a floor test after the Shiv Sena split was wrong, but Uddhav Thackeray could not be reinstated as he resigned before facing the floor test. In Subhash Desai, the Court had also held that a legislative party cannot act independent of the political party, and that legislative majority was irrelevant in determining which group was the real party.

Justice Bagchi opined that the ECI was wrong in considering whether there was majority in the legislature party. "It should be something to do with the political party", the judge remarked.

For context, the ECI's recognition of Shinde faction as the real Shiv Sena was based on the reasoning that they had legislative majority (i.e majority of MLAs were with Shinde). In 2024, the Speaker rejected the disqualification petitions by following the ECI's reasoning that Shinde group enjoyed legislative majority. Prior to that, in 2023, the Supreme Court had refused to stay the ECI decision, but permitted the Uddhav faction to retain the name "Shiv Sena (Uddhav Balasaheb Thackeray)" and the symbol "flaming torch" in terms of paragraph 133(IV) of the ECI order (during the pendency of the matter).

Uddhav faction's submissions

Today, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing on behalf of the Uddhav Thackeray faction, made submissions in connection with the disqualification issue. He took the Court through a list of dates and contended inter-alia that:

- The ECI does not have jurisdiction to decide the validity of a party's constitution. Its decision, which refused to acknowledge the 2018 party Constitution on the purported ground that the Constitution was not on record, was erroneous. Besides, Article 11A of the constitution was highlighted before the ECI in 2013;

- Both parties acknowledge that they were appointed under the 2018 party constitution and neither party has challenged the said constitution. For as long as Eknath Shinde was a Cabinet Minister (while Uddhav Thackeray was Chief Minister), no issue was raised qua the 2013 or the 2018 party Constitutions;

- Uddhav Thackeray's status as leader of the party was never doubted by the respondents (including Eknath Shinde), or the ECI, or the Maharashtra Speaker. It was Uddhav Thackeray who, as Paksh Pramukh, appointed Eknath Shinde as Group Leader and Sunil Prabhu as Chief Whip. But in 2019, 31 MLAs "voluntarily gave up membership of the party" and resolved to declare Eknath Shinde as party leader and Bharat Gogawale as the Chief Whip. Notices were issued by Uddhav Thackeray while calling a meeting after the "anti-party" actions, to the effect that failure to attend would attract action under 10th Schedule, but the 31 MLAs did not attend the meeting. The MLAs' actions amounted to voluntarily giving up of membership, which is a ground for disqualification as per paragraph 2 of the 10th schedule.

- The 31 MLAs' defection was pre-meditated. They first went to Surat, then to Guwahati (in BJP-ruled stated). The MLAs' response was that they met at Surat by chance, but that could not have been a coincidence. The MLAs were in constant communication with the BJP and Eknath Shinde openly stated that they had the support of a big national party.

- After the MLAs' defection, Uddhav Thackeray convened a meeting, and it was resolved that Eknath Shinde be replaced by Ajay Chaudhri as Group Leader. The resolution was conveyed to the Deputy Speaker and he recognized it. However, the 31 MLAs passed a resolution recognizing Eknath Shinde as Group leader and Gogawale as Chief Whip, which was conveyed to the Speaker.

- The question before the ECI was not of the split of a 'political' party, but rather, a 'legislature' party. There was a split in the 'legislature party' and in terms of what was held in Subhash Desai, a faction of a legislature party cannot change the Group Leader or the Chief Whip.

- The 10th schedule no longer recognizes the concept of 'split'. The only defence is merger with another party, which has admittedly not happened in this case. A splinter legislative group cannot claim to be the real party.

- The issues have implications for the system of representative democracy. The defection of the 31 MLAs led to the toppling of the elected Maharashtra government, and eventually Eknath Shinde became Chief Minister.

In this regard, Sibal also spoke about the emerging trend of a legislature party merging with another political party. He submitted that when legislators contest on one party's ticket using its symbol, and then merge with another party and represent another symbol, the end result is that the electorate is not represented by the government it elected. This kind of manipulation and defection can change electoral verdicts and reduce the process of elections to a farce.

"Is it not fundamentally against the basic structure of the Constitution that the representative of a party suddenly moves to another party, forms coalition with it, topples the government and doesn't allow the disqualification proceedings to be decided until the next election?", Sibal asked.

- The whole matter suffered fait accompli, as no mandamus was issued to the Speaker. The Speaker responded to the notices only after the matter came before the Constitution Bench (in 2023). The 10th schedule is rendered otiose if the Speaker, an Election Tribunal, does not decide disqualification issues in time. Due to the delay occasioned, a government with no legal foundation served its term.

In response to Sibal's submissions, the bench made some crucial remarks. CJI Kant questioned whether there is any defined parameter in ECI's guidelines or the party Constitution on what constitutes majority of the political party. He also said that the meaning and limits of the term 'majority' reflect a gray area (which needs to be considered). Sibal replied that the Supreme Court's judgment in Sadiq Ali case has answered these issues by laying down tests to determine which faction has the majority.

Justice Bagchi queried if the election symbol belongs to the 'political' party. When Sibal replied that the symbol does belong to the political party, the judge said that the ECI was wrong in considering whether there was majority in the legislature party. "It should be something to do with the political party", the judge said.

The hearing will continue tomorrow at 2 pm.

Appearance: Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal and Devadatt Kamat (for Uddhav faction); Senior Advocates Neeraj Kishan Kaul and Maninder Singh (for respondents)

Case : Sunil Prabhu v. Eknath Shinde SLP(C) No. 1644-1662/2024 (and connected case)

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-shiv-sena-eknath-shinde-uddhav-thackeray-speaker-refusal-to-disqualify-mlas-defection-political-party-control-over-legislature-party-544511

Justice-abhay-oka-protect-peaceful-protests-cant-silence- Dissent

Former Supreme Court judge Justice Abhay Oka on Saturday said that constitutional courts must quash criminal cases instituted to silence dissent and protect citizens' fundamental right to free speech, irrespective of whether judges agree with the views expressed.

He stressed that it is not the function of courts to "preach" or "teach" citizens what they should or should not say.

Justice Oka said,

"Peaceful protest within the constitutional means are a fundamental right of citizens and if we do not allow people to express displeasure by making peaceful protest, there won't be democracy. There are citizens who are compelled to approach the courts and in particular, constitutional courts on the ground by registering an offence. Their freedom of speech and expression is sought to be infringed. When such cases come before the court, it is the duty of the court to quash the offences. The court may not like what the petitioners have said or expressed but still it is the duty of the court to protect the freedom of speech and expression. It is not the function of the court to preach or teach the petitioner what s/he should say and what s/he should not have said. That's not the function of the court at all. All that court has to see whether an offence is made out and whether there is violation of fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. And if court is satisfied that there is violation, court has to grant relief. Court is not concerned whether court likes what the person has said."

Further the judge said that it is the 'bounden' duty of the courts to ensure the freedom of speech and expression is 'protected' and not 'stifled upon' and in fact the courts must remain ever vigilant to thwart any attempt to undermine the constitution and its values. 

"The courts must not be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and expression. I always believe that the courts and in particular constitutional courts must be at the forefront to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. In fact, it is the bounden duty of the courts to ensure that constitution and ideals of the constitution are not trampled upon. Endeavour of the courts should always be to protect and promote fundamental rights including freedom of speech and expression which is one of the most cherish cherish rights a citizen can have in a liberal constitutional framework. The reason is that if courts are not going to protect these freedoms, these fundamental rights, who else is going to protect? Which institution is going to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen? So, it is a bounden duty of the courts to do so," Justice Oka clarified. 

Justice Oka then referred to the recent speech of Supreme Court judge Justice Ujjal Bhuyan who had criticised a Bombay High Court judge for disallowing a group of persons to peacefully protest the killings of children and women in Gaza. 

"Few days back I read a speech rendered by my esteemed colleague in Supreme Court, with whom I shared bench for long time. He referred to a case decided by I don't know which is the High Court. It was a case where somebody wanted to hold peaceful protest to deprecate what has happened in some foreign country. Permission was denied by the police. The petitioners approached the court. The court told the petitioners that look why you are bothered about something happening in foreign country, do something about what is happening in our India in our country and the court refused to grant permission. Now court is not concerned with this aspect. Somebody wants to have peaceful protest without committing any offence. Police have to permit it. The protest may on any ground so long as it is a lawful protest within the constitutional framework. It is the duty of the courts to permit it," Justice Oka said.

Justice Oka was speaking at the inaugural lecture of Advocate Haroon Solkar Memorial Lecture Series, wherein he spoke on the topic - 'Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21: Followed or Forgotten.' The event was organised by Advocates Mubin Solkar and his team.

In his speech, Justice Oka reminded that Article 51A which provides for fundamental duties of the citizens are the same duties of the State and its instrumentalities as well and thus, when the State infringes the fundamental rights of citizens' right to free speech and express, it is basically violating its fundamental duty to uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens and to respect the 'ideals' of the Constitution of India. 

"All our law laws are framed under the Constitution and therefore it becomes collective duty of the State to abide by not only the Constitution but laws framed under it. Now what are the ideals under the constitution? We'll find in preamble. One of the most important ideals is Secularism, other is Democracy and most importantly Liberty and liberty of thought and expression is also an ideal under the Constitution and therefore it becomes duty of the State to respect these ideals and the provisions of the Constitution especially chapter one fundamental rights. But in the present day we rarely see government respecting the ideals under the Constitution," Justice Oka said. 

Unfortunately, Justice Oka highlighted, that neither political leaders nor the law enforcing agencies are abiding by their duty to protect this important fundamental right.

"I have seen during last several years, last few years especially that offences under section 153A and 153B of the Indian Penal Code and offences are applied very casually only because the views expressed by certain persons are not liked by others. A standup comedian makes a fun and says something. He is booked for an offence. Again the reason is the law enforcing agencies are ignorant about the basics of our Constitution. Our police have always ignored and even sadly some of the courts have always ignored this. But now we find that when the people in position are not able to tolerate the hostile point of view, they register offences under these provisions. As I said police, we can't blame police if they don't apply the test laid down by the Supreme Court. But sadly, some of the courts do not follow that test. It is binding on every court because Supreme Court has adopted that test," Justice Oka said. 

The judge further pointed out the increase in intolerance to the thoughts which are not liked by the majority.

"Those who are in power do not tolerate criticism. I'm not speaking about any particular political party but this is the feature of our political system. We have forgotten that if you do not like a particular viewpoint, instead of attacking the person who expresses it, we must try to convince him by presenting our own point of view. Even if we feel that the views expressed are wrong, they should be patiently answered by adopting a thought process which we feel is right. Due to ever increasing intolerance, the freedom of speech and expression is under a threat. In a democracy, every citizen has a right to put forward his demands to the State and to the State machinery. That is his right. The State cannot ignore such demands of representation. It is the duty of the State to deal with every request, every representation, every expression of thought by a citizen of India. The government may or may not accept it, but it is the duty of the government to consider it. The government must have dialogue and discussion about any demand put forward by citizens. But perhaps with the passage of time, we have all forgotten these golden principles," Justice Oka said. 

What do the amended FCRA Rules say?

How does the Ministry of Home Affairs regulate foreign donations? What are the key changes in the FCRA Amendment Rules, 2026? How do the new Rules affect the purposes for which NGOs can receive foreign funds? What penalties apply for violations?

File photo of Opposition MPs demanding the withdrawal of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026. ANI

Vijaita Singh

The story so far:

On June 22, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) notified the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Rules, 2026, to amend the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 2011.This is the tenth amendment to the Rules under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (FCRA).

How does the MHA regulate foreign donations?

The MHA regulates foreign donations in India through the FCRA to ensure that such funds do not adversely affect the country’s internal security. The legislation was first enacted in 1976. In 2010, it was repealed and replaced with a new legislation. The 2010 Act came into force on May 1, 2011 and has been amended in 2016, 2018, and 2020. The FCRA registration is valid for five years, after which the NGO has to apply for a renewal. Since 2015, the FCRA registrations of more than 18,000 NGOs have been cancelled. As on June 22, there are 14,456 FCRA-registered NGOs active in the country.

What are the broad amendments proposed to the FCRA Rules?

All NGOs and associations registered under the FCRA, 2010, are required to disclose their specific activities and the geographical scope of their programmes. The Rules no longer allow general permission under the FCRA and indicate tighter scrutiny on how NGOs utilise foreign funds.

Any new registration will have to follow the said norms. The Rules further broaden the definition of ‘key functionary’ of an NGO beyond office bearers and directors to include trustees, partners, the Karta of a Hindu undivided family, governing body members, or anyone controlling or managing the organisation.

They also require NGOs to mandatorily disclose social media accounts, websites, and declare whether the association or its key functionaries has brought out any publication during the year, which includes books, magazines or newspaper articles.

The Rules also impose a fee for registration for each specified purpose and for each State or Union Territory (U.T.) in which an NGO operates. So, NGOs operating across multiple sectors or regions now face higher registration costs.

What amendments apply to the programmes or purposes for which an NGO intends to receive foreign donations?

NGOs can receive foreign contributions for social, educational, religious, economic, and cultural programmes. The amended Rules state that the certificate of registration or the application form for new registrations shall specify the purpose or purposes for which registration is granted, chosen only from the list of purposes as specified in the Schedule appended to the rules; and the States or U.T.s in which the NGO proposes to undertake activities.

Those with existing FCRA registrations are expected to update the purpose and intimate the Central government within a year. Some categories specifically exclude political activities.

The educational purpose lists 22 activities, but adds the qualifier “strictly non-political in nature” to the category covering awareness programmes on constitutional rights, fundamental duties, and civic responsibilities.

Under cultural purpose, there are 18 categories, including “promotion of contemporary arts inspired by Indian traditions.” The Rules specify that these must exclude political or ideological content.

As many as 16 categories of religious activities have been permitted which includes “conduct of religious education, moral instruction, satsangs, discourses, and meditation retreats (excluding proselytisation)” and “burial/ cremation ground development and maintenance.”

There are 19 categories under the economic purpose and 30 items under the social category.

What are the penalties for violations?

The MHA has also notified an order specifying penalties for FCRA violations, including excess administrative spending, speculative investments, misuse of funds, unauthorised receipt or utilisation of foreign contributions, and the use of funds for unapproved purposes or in States/U.T.s not covered by an NGO’s registration or prior permission.

Any utilisation of funds for purposes other than those for which they were received can attract a penalty of up to 30% of the amount misused or ₹₹1 lakh, whichever is higher. Likewise, using foreign contributions for purposes or in areas not covered by an NGO’s registration or prior permission invites a penalty of 30% of the amount involved or ₹1 lakh, whichever is higher.

In addition, spending beyond the permitted administrative expense limit or engaging in speculative use of funds will be penalised with fines calculated as a percentage of the amount involved, subject to a minimum of ₹1 lakh.

What is the Opposition saying?

Opposition members have said that the new Rules will adversely affect the functioning of civil society organisations. Congress General Secretary (Organisation) K.C. Venugopal said that forcing NGOs to choose from a “rigid, government-mandated list” of activities and restricting their operational geography would undermine their ability to respond to emergencies. John Brittas, Communist Party of India (Marxist) Rajya Sabha member, wrote to Home Minister Amit Shah raising constitutional concerns. “Collectively, these changes signify a decisive shift from regulating foreign contribution to regulating voluntary organisations themselves,” he wrote.

The Rules impose a fee for registration for each specified purpose and for each

State or U.T. in which an NGO

operates

Check this out: What do the amended FCRA Rules say?

https://epaper.thehindu.com/ccidist-ws/th/th_delhi/issues/191528/OPS/GUVG625VK.1+G0IG63VJH.1.html?rev=2026-06-28T00%3A41%3A05%2B05%3A30

UDF government’s stance on PM SHRI unconstitutionalRanjith Thampan

UDF government’s stance on PM SHRI unconstitutional

Ranjith Thampan

The stance of the United Democratic Front (UDF) government that it cannot withdraw from a memorandum of understanding (MoU) entered into between the Secretary, Education department, Kerala, and the Secretary, Education department, Government of India, on 16/10/2025 on the Prime Minister’s Schools for Rising India (PM SHRI) scheme is unsustainable.

Chief Minister V.D. Satheesan, who had an active practice in the Kerala High Court for more than a decade and a constitutional expert, is not expected to take such a stance, which is per se unconstitutional.

Article 299 of the Constitution stipulates the manner in which the Union of India and State governments enter into legally binding contracts. In accordance with the said Article, all binding contracts of the Union of India has to be expressed to be made by the President and all contracts regarding the State government by the Governor.

The said Article stipulates that its execution should be by the persons duly authorised. The Supreme Court has consistently held from 1961 onwards in the State of Bihar vs Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 110) that a contract entered into in violation of the procedure mentioned in Article 299 not in the name of the Governor of the State or the President is not a contract and is a nullity. The said declaration of law was followed by the Kerala High Court also (Trivandrum Golf Club vs State of Kerala [2008 (4) KHC 472].

Thus any agreement, which is not expressed in the name of the Governor of Kerala cannot constitute a legally enforceable contract regarding the State government.

The MoU was entered into by the Secretary, Education department, Government of Kerala, and the Additional Secretary, Department of Education, Government of India, and not in the name of the President and the Governor. Hence, the said MoU is a nullity.

Under Rule 10 of the Rules of Business in Government, it is clearly provided that all decisions having financial repercussions for the State shall have the consent of the Finance department. Any decision taken by a department without such consultation is legally unsustainable.

In the present case, for implementing the PM SHRI scheme, 40% of the expenditure will have to be borne by the State government. Hence, the scheme will have financial implications for the State and sanction from the Finance department is necessary. Many High Courts across the country, including in Bal Kalyani and others vs State of Maharashtra and others (1993 KHC 1414), have held that any decision by a department having financial implication without the consent of the Finance department is void abinitio.

Under Article 166 of the Constitution, Kerala has framed Rules of Business in Government relating to the administrative functions of the State government. As per the said Rules, important policy decisions are to be taken only by the Council of Ministers (Cabinet). Various High Courts have categorically stated that a decision on a policy matter taken unilaterally by an individual Minister, even Chief Minister, without the consent of the Council of Ministers is void abinitio.

Here, the implementation of the PM SHRI scheme is a policy matter for which a decision has to be taken by the Council of Ministers. The Cabinet of the previous LDF government had held discussions for taking a policy decision for implementing the scheme. However, no decision was taken and the issue was adjourned till the expiry of the government’s term in 2026.

In the meanwhile, the MoU was executed by the department secretaries of the Union and State governments. Since the aforesaid matter is a policy decision, any decision taken unilaterally by any individual Minister without any Cabinet decision is a nullity.

In view of the aforesaid legal situation, it is certain that the MoU is only a in principle decision of the department, which has no legal force. Hence, the stance of the UDF government that it cannot withdraw from the MoU is not sustainable. It is difficult to believe that Mr. Satheesan is unaware of the aforesaid legal position.

(The writer is a Senior Advocate at the High Court of Kerala)

വിദേശ ധനസഹായം കൈപ്പറ്റുന്നതിന് എൻജിഒകൾക്ക് (NGOs) പുതിയ കർശന നിയന്ത്രണങ്ങൾ;

വിദേശ ധനസഹായം കൈപ്പറ്റുന്നതിന് എൻജിഒകൾക്ക് (NGOs) പുതിയ കർശന നിയന്ത്രണങ്ങൾ; സോഷ്യൽ മീഡിയ അക്കൗണ്ടുകളുടെ വിവരങ്ങൾ വെളിപ്പെടുത്തൽ നിർബന്ധമാക്കി

​വിജൈത സിംഗ്, ന്യൂഡൽഹി

​വിദേശ ഫണ്ടുകൾ കൈപ്പറ്റാൻ ആഗ്രഹിക്കുന്ന സന്നദ്ധ സംഘടനകൾ (NGOs) ഇനിമുതൽ കേന്ദ്ര സർക്കാർ നിഷ്കർഷിച്ചിട്ടുള്ള നിർദ്ദിഷ്ട പ്രവർത്തനങ്ങളിൽ മാത്രം ഒതുങ്ങിനിൽക്കണമെന്ന് ഫോറിൻ കോൺട്രിബ്യൂഷൻ റഗുലേഷൻ ആക്ട് (FCRA), 2010-ലെ ഏറ്റവും പുതിയ ചട്ട ഭേദഗതി വ്യക്തമാക്കുന്നു. തിങ്കളാഴ്ചയാണ് ഇത് സംബന്ധിച്ച വിജ്ഞാപനം പുറത്തിറങ്ങിയത്.

​വിദേശ ഫണ്ട് തേടുന്ന എൻജിഒകൾ സാമൂഹികം, സാമ്പത്തികം, വിദ്യാഭ്യാസം, സാംസ്കാരികം, മതം എന്നിങ്ങനെ അനുവദനീയമായ അഞ്ച് വിഭാഗങ്ങളിൽ ഒന്നിൽ രജിസ്റ്റർ ചെയ്യേണ്ടതുണ്ട്. എന്നാൽ, ഓരോ വിഭാഗത്തിൽപ്പെട്ടവർക്കും പ്രത്യേക പ്രവർത്തന പട്ടിക തയ്യാറാക്കി നൽകുന്നത് ഇതാദ്യമായാണ്.

​എൻജിഒകൾ ഇനിമുതൽ തങ്ങളുടെ പ്രവർത്തനങ്ങൾ, പരിപാടികളുടെ ഭൂമിശാസ്ത്രപരമായ വ്യാപ്തി (ഏതൊക്കെ പ്രദേശങ്ങളിൽ പ്രവർത്തിക്കുന്നു എന്നത്), വെബ്‌സൈറ്റുകൾ, സോഷ്യൽ മീഡിയ അക്കൗണ്ടുകൾ, പ്രസിദ്ധീകരണങ്ങൾ എന്നിവയുടെ വിവരങ്ങൾ നിർബന്ധമായും വെളിപ്പെടുത്തണം. മുൻപ് FCRA രജിസ്ട്രേഷൻ ഉള്ളവർക്ക് ഒരൊറ്റ ഫീസ് മാത്രമായിരുന്നെങ്കിൽ, പുതിയ നിയമപ്രകാരം അവർ പ്രവർത്തിക്കുന്ന ഓരോ വിഭാഗത്തിനും ഓരോ സംസ്ഥാനത്തിനും അല്ലെങ്കിൽ കേന്ദ്രഭരണ പ്രദേശത്തിനും പ്രത്യേകമായി ഫീസ് അടയ്‌ക്കേണ്ടതുണ്ട്.

• ​പുതിയ രജിസ്ട്രേഷനുകൾ: പുതിയ മാനദണ്ഡങ്ങൾ പാലിച്ചുമാത്രമേ ഇനി രജിസ്ട്രേഷൻ അനുവദിക്കൂ.
• ​നിലവിലുള്ള രജിസ്ട്രേഷനുകൾ: നിലവിൽ രജിസ്റ്റർ ചെയ്തിട്ടുള്ള സംഘടനകൾ അടുത്ത ഒരു വർഷത്തിനുള്ളിൽ ഈ മാറ്റങ്ങൾ നടപ്പിലാക്കണം.
• ​ലംഘനങ്ങൾക്കുള്ള പിഴ: നിയമങ്ങൾ ലംഘിക്കുന്ന പക്ഷം കുറഞ്ഞത് 1 ലക്ഷം രൂപ പിഴ ഈടാക്കുമെന്ന് കേന്ദ്ര ആഭ്യന്തര മന്ത്രാലയത്തിന്റെ മറ്റൊരു ഉത്തരവിൽ പറയുന്നു.

​മുഖ്യ ഭാരവാഹികളുടെ നിർവചനത്തിൽ മാറ്റം

​വിദേശത്തുനിന്നുള്ള എല്ലാ സംഭാവനകളും ആഭ്യന്തര മന്ത്രാലയമാണ് FCRA വഴി നിയന്ത്രിക്കുന്നത്. വിദേശ ഫണ്ടുകൾ സ്വീകരിക്കുന്നത് ഇന്ത്യയുടെ പരമാധികാരത്തെയും അഖണ്ഡതയെയും ബാധിക്കില്ലെന്നും, വിദേശ രാജ്യങ്ങളുമായുള്ള സൗഹൃദ ബന്ധത്തെയോ സാമുദായിക സൗഹാർദ്ദത്തെയോ തകർക്കില്ലെന്നുമുള്ള ഒരു ഉറപ്പുപത്രം (undertaking) നൽകുക മാത്രമായിരുന്നു മുൻപത്തെ നിയമഭേദഗതികളിൽ എൻജിഒകൾ ചെയ്യേണ്ടിയിരുന്നത്.

​എന്നാൽ, പുതിയ ഭേദഗതികൾ പ്രകാരം ഒരു എൻജിഒയുടെ 'മുഖ്യ ഭാരവാഹി' (key functionary) എന്നതിന്റെ നിർവചനം ഓഫീസ് ഭാരവാഹികൾക്കും ഡയറക്ടർമാർക്കും അപ്പുറത്തേക്ക് വ്യാപിപ്പിച്ചു. ഇനിമുതൽ ട്രസ്റ്റിമാർ, പാർട്ണർമാർ, ഹിന്ദു അവിഭക്ത കുടുംബത്തിന്റെ (HUF) തലവനായ 'കർത്താ', ഗവേണിംഗ് ബോഡി അംഗങ്ങൾ, സംഘടനയെ നിയന്ത്രിക്കുകയോ നിയന്ത്രിക്കാൻ സഹായിക്കുകയോ ചെയ്യുന്ന മറ്റാരും ഈ പരിധിയിൽ വരും.

​പ്രത്യേക ശ്രദ്ധയ്ക്ക്: ഇന്ത്യൻ വംശജരല്ലാത്ത വിദേശ പൗരന്മാർ മുഖ്യ ഭാരവാഹികളായിട്ടുള്ള സംഘടനകൾക്ക്, കേന്ദ്ര സർക്കാരിന്റെ പ്രത്യേക അനുമതിയില്ലാത്തപക്ഷം, രജിസ്ട്രേഷനോ മുൻകൂർ അനുമതിയോ സാധാരണയായി നൽകുന്നതല്ല.

​കൂടാതെ, സംഘടനയോ അതിന്റെ ഏതെങ്കിലും മുഖ്യ ഭാരവാഹികളോ വർഷത്തിൽ പുസ്തകങ്ങൾ, മാസികകൾ, പത്രലേഖനങ്ങൾ ഉൾപ്പെടെയുള്ള എന്തെങ്കിലും പ്രസിദ്ധീകരണങ്ങൾ പുറത്തിറക്കിയിട്ടുണ്ടോ എന്നും എൻജിഒകൾ വ്യക്തമാക്കേണ്ടതുണ്ട്.

​വിദേശ സംഭാവന ഫോമുകളിൽ (F-C) ഏകീകരണം കൊണ്ടുവരുന്നതിനും ആവർത്തനങ്ങൾ ഒഴിവാക്കുന്നതിനുമാണ് ഈ ഭേദഗതികൾ വരുത്തിയതെന്ന് ഒരു മുതിർന്ന സർക്കാർ ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥൻ വ്യക്തമാക്കി.

Amended FCRA Rules stipulate that NGOs must stick to specified activities in their category and geographical areas; disclosure of social media accounts and other publications made mandatory

Vijaita Singh NEW DELHI

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) wanting to access foreign funds must now stick to a list of activities specified by the Centre, according to the latest amendment to the Rules of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), 2010, notified on Monday.

While NGOs seeking foreign funds are required to register under one of the five permitted categories, namely social, economic, educational, cultural, and religious, this is the first time separate activity lists have been laid out for those in each category.

NGOs must now disclose their activities, the geographical scope of their programmes, their websites, social media accounts, and publications. They must pay separate fees for each category and State or Union Territory they operate in, as opposed to the previous single fee for FCRA registrants.

Any new registration must follow the new norms and existing registrations must comply with the changes within the next year. Any violations will be penalised with a minimum fine of ₹1 lakh, according to another order from the Union Home Ministry.

The Ministry regulates all foreign donations through the FCRA. Earlier amendments of the Rules only required NGOs to give an undertaking that their acceptance of foreign funds is not likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India or impact friendly relations with foreign states or disrupt communal harmony.

ഡയറക്ടർമാർക്കും അപ്പുറത്തേക്ക് വ്യാപിപ്പിച്ചു. ഇനിമുതൽ ട്രസ്റ്റിമാർ, പാർട്ണർമാർ, ഹിന്ദു അവിഭക്ത കുടുംബത്തിന്റെ (HUF) തലവനായ 'കർത്താ', ഗവേണിംഗ് ബോഡി അംഗങ്ങൾ, സംഘടനയെ നിയന്ത്രിക്കുകയോ നിയന്ത്രിക്കാൻ സഹായിക്കുകയോ ചെയ്യുന്ന മറ്റാരും ഈ പരിധിയിൽ വരും.

​പ്രത്യേക ശ്രദ്ധയ്ക്ക്: ഇന്ത്യൻ വംശജരല്ലാത്ത വിദേശ പൗരന്മാർ മുഖ്യ ഭാരവാഹികളായിട്ടുള്ള സംഘടനകൾക്ക്, കേന്ദ്ര സർക്കാരിന്റെ പ്രത്യേക അനുമതിയില്ലാത്തപക്ഷം, രജിസ്ട്രേഷനോ മുൻകൂർ അനുമതിയോ സാധാരണയായി നൽകുന്നതല്ല.

​കൂടാതെ, സംഘടനയോ അതിന്റെ ഏതെങ്കിലും മുഖ്യ ഭാരവാഹികളോ വർഷത്തിൽ പുസ്തകങ്ങൾ, മാസികകൾ, പത്രലേഖനങ്ങൾ ഉൾപ്പെടെയുള്ള എന്തെങ്കിലും പ്രസിദ്ധീകരണങ്ങൾ പുറത്തിറക്കിയിട്ടുണ്ടോ എന്നും എൻജിഒകൾ വ്യക്തമാക്കേണ്ടതുണ്ട്.

​വിദേശ സംഭാവന ഫോമുകളിൽ (F-C) ഏകീകരണം കൊണ്ടുവരുന്നതിനും ആവർത്തനങ്ങൾ ഒഴിവാക്കുന്നതിനുമാണ് ഈ ഭേദഗതികൾ വരുത്തിയതെന്ന് ഒരു മുതിർന്ന സർക്കാർ ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥൻ വ്യക്തമാക്കി.

not be considered eligible for registration or prior permission, unless specifically permitted by the Centre, according to the new Rules. NGOs must also declare whether their association or any of their key functionaries brought out any publication during the year, including books, magazines, and newspaper articles.

A senior government official said that the amendments were effected to bring uniformity in Foreign Contribution forms (F-C) and to avoid duplication.

Check this out: Centre tightens norms for foreign contributions

https://epaper.thehindu.com/ccidist-ws/th/th_delhi/issues/190907/OPS/GU1G5GBFL.1+G1OG5GU7B.1.html?rev=2026-06-24T00%3A48%3A27%2B05%3A30

The apex court rings its own chain

The Supreme Court’s reliance on suo motu cognisance has turned a once ‘rare but highly visible’ jurisdiction into a recurring instrument shaped by primetime attention and media reports; while it keeps ‘ringing’ its own chain through televised listings and supervision, the trial courts below it continue doing the work

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V. Venkatesan

In 1605, on his accession, the Mughal Emperor Jahangir fastened a chain outside his palace. Any subject denied justice by his administration could pull the chain and reach the emperor directly. The chain was, in conception, a remedy against the bureaucracy. The Indian Supreme Court is now, in its suo motu cognisance of individual criminal cases, the bureaucracy itself, ringing its own version of the chain. Each televised listing is the sound of the apex court calling attention to itself.

Media and motive

The latest instance is the court’s suo motu cognisance of Twisha Sharma’s death, registered under the title ‘In Re Alleged Institutional Bias and Procedural Discrepancies in the Unnatural Death of a Young Girl at Her Matrimonial Home’. The title prejudges its own inquiry. Institutional bias has not been judicially established at any level. The apex court’s own office report, signed by the Assistant Registrar on May 23, records the basis of registration. The case was registered, the document says, ‘based on media reports and other attending circumstances’. Two days later, the same bench appealed to the media to refrain from recording statements of witnesses. A court that acts on press reports while admonishing the journalists who filed them is, at the same moment, both consumer and critic of the same source.

The ground on which the apex court arrived was not vacant. A magistrate in Bhopal had remanded the husband, a practising advocate, to seven days of police custody. The Madhya Pradesh High Court had directed a second autopsy by an AIIMS Delhi team. The Bar Council of India had suspended the husband’s licence. The State government had proposed transferring the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) before the apex listing. The institutions whose bias the apex title alleges had been moving against the accused for nearly a fortnight.

Marc Galanter and Vasujith Ram put the central question to this reflex with care. Their study appears in A Qualified Hope (Cambridge University Press, 2019). Why does the response of the higher judiciary to executive or police failure take ‘the form of these singular heroic interventions rather than promoting some institutional shake-up, some initiative to empower and equip courts lower in the judicial hierarchy’? Their diagnosis was unsparing. The reflex carries, they wrote, ‘an echo of the disdain with which higher courts in India frequently treat the efforts of the lower judiciary’.

Easier path

Suo motu cognisance, in matters of this kind, is the easier of the two paths open to the apex court. The harder path is the slow, unspectacular work of reforming the judiciary it heads. The first requires only the bench’s decision to list the matter. The second requires sustained cooperation: with the High Courts on case management and supervision under Article 235 (control over subordinate courts), with State governments on funding trial-court infrastructure, with the executive on judicial appointments, and with the National Judicial Academy on training. The asymmetry between the energies devoted to the two paths is what produces the diagnosis Galanter and Ram named.

Where the easier path is taken, the court chooses persuasion over compulsion. The apex bench has, in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation v. SEBI (2012), a five-judge Constitution Bench authority on media trial. Sahara permits a court to issue a postponement order against media publication. The test is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice. The order is available only where no less restrictive means will work. The doctrine is settled. In the Twisha matter, the bench had every occasion to invoke it. It chose instead to request the media not to record statements of potential witnesses. A request from the apex court carries moral weight. But it is not the legal instrument it has at hand for this very problem.

The post-2019 record is unkind to the pro-suo-motu case. In the R.G. Kar matter, the Supreme Court registered cognisance on August 18, 2024. Sanjay Roy had been arrested by the Kolkata Police eight days earlier. The Calcutta High Court had handed the probe to the CBI on August 13, 2024. The Sealdah trial court convicted Roy in January 2025 and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The trial judge did the work. Apex monitoring of CBI status reports did not.

Hathras is closer to the Bhopal facts and more instructive. The Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court registered the case suo motu in October 2020. The Supreme Court, after entertaining transfer petitions, handed monitoring back to the High Court within weeks. That earlier bench saw the architectural point: the High Court was already in motion, and the apex role was supervisory. In July 2024, following the Hathras Satsang stampede that claimed 121 lives, the court declined a PIL. The bench said that the High Court was equipped to deal with the case. The same principle applies in Bhopal too.

Scarce attention

Lakhimpur Kheri sharpens the matter. The apex court took cognisance in October 2021 and, in April 2022, set aside the High Court’s bail order for the main accused, Ashish Mishra. It then eased him back into liberty. Interim bail came in 2023. Regular bail followed in 2024. As of early 2026, the trial court had examined only 44 of 131 witnesses. In Manipur, the suo motu case over the viral video from July 2023 has yet to produce a conviction. Apex supervision has not been the route to faster justice.

A second observation runs alongside. In 2019, Galanter and Ram called suo motu ‘rare but highly visible’. The first half of that description has lapsed. What was once a residual jurisdiction is now a recurring instrument. A trigger sequence has begun to repeat. Sustained primetime attention is followed by cognisance. The Solicitor General has now confirmed the sequence in open court. Appearing for the Union in the Twisha matter, he told the bench that ‘it is also because of this media intervention that a lot of progress has happened’.

The numbers since the chapter, authored by Galanter and Ram, went to press confirm the rule. The Supreme Court Observer, working from the apex court’s own Case Status records, counts 35 suo motu matters in the five years from 2020 to 2024.

The preceding fifteen years had seen only 31 in total. The annual figures, excluding contempt, were 10 in 2020, eight in 2021, one in 2022, four in 2023, and 12 in 2024. The trend continues. In 2025, the court’s numbering reached 10 civil suo motu writs and three criminal matters. Nine of the 10 civil matters are publicly listed. By May 25 this year, the count already stood at four civil and four criminal matters. Both totals exclude suo motu transfer and contempt, which exercise distinct constitutional powers. The criminal count, in particular, has risen sharply. Four months and three weeks have already exceeded the criminal count for all of 2025.

Judicial attention is a scarce resource. The National Crime Records Bureau recorded 6,450 dowry deaths in 2022, with convictions in only 11 to 17 per cent of cases. The court has the capacity to list one. The criterion of selection is, on the present record, temporal rather than legal. Galanter and Ram closed their chapter with a question. They asked whether suo motu was ‘an instance of effective use of the scarce resource of judicial attention’. The seven years since they wrote have not produced an easier answer.

None of this is to deny the seriousness of the Twisha Sharma matter. The accused’s mother is a retired judge. The husband is a lawyer. The family of the deceased has reason to fear local proximity. The constitutional response to that fear is independent investigation under judicial supervision, conducted promptly. The court, however, disposed of the matter on the first day after taking note of the “narrative” in the media that a fair investigation was being denied on account of the involvement of the judiciary.

The chain Jahangir hung was a remedy against an unaccountable bureaucracy. The apex court is now that bureaucracy. Each televised listing is the sound it makes to draw attention to a failure it has the power, and the constitutional duty, to repair. Until the harder of its two paths is walked with the energy now devoted to the easier one, the chain will keep ringing. The trial courts below it will keep doing the work.

(V. Venkatesan is a journalist and legal researcher.)

LETTER & SPIRIT

THE GIST

The ground on which the apex court arrived was not vacant, with the magistrate, the High Court, the Bar Council of India and the State government already acting in the Twisha Sharma case.

The harder path before the apex court is the slow, unspectacular work of reforming the judiciary through better case management, trial-court infrastructure, appointments and training.

Judicial attention is a scarce resource, but sustained primetime attention is increasingly followed by cognisance, raising questions about the use of that attention.

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Mere Exercise Of Supervisory Role Over Temple & Appointment Of Pujaris Won't Confer Title Upon It : Supreme Court Yash Mittal 6 May 2026 1:48 PM (5 mins read )

The Supreme Court has observed that the mere fact that a group exercised a managerial or supervisory control over the temple would not ipso facto confer title of the temple upon them. “The mere fact that the society exercised certain supervisory or managerial functions over the temple or participated in the appointment of “pujaris” would not ipso facto confer title upon it.”, the court observed. Also Read - S.28 Specific Relief Act | Separate Application Not Needed To Rescind Agreement To Sell For Buyer's Default : Suprme Court A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta set aside the Rajasthan High Court's decision, which had upheld the title of the Respondents over the temple 'Moorti Swarup Shri Govardhan Nath Ji' in Kota, Rajasthan, despite their failure to produce any document showing their title over the temple. The High Court affirmed the trial court's decree declaring title in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, primarily on the ground that they exercised managerial and supervisory control over the temple, including the appointment of priests. In doing so, the Court dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that the defendant's failure to establish title operated to the benefit of the respondent. Add LiveLaw as a Preferred Source Google Issues Directives Challenging the High Court's order, the appellant—appointed as the temple caretaker through a long line of succession and claiming ownership over the property—approached the Supreme Court contending that the decree in favour of the respondent was legally unsustainable. It was argued that the respondent had failed to establish title to the temple, and that the appellant's inability to prove his own title could not, by itself, enure to the benefit of the plaintiff-respondent, particularly in the absence of proof of their independent title. Also Read - Ensure Persons With Disabilities Scoring Above General Cut-Off Are Considered In Unreserved Vacancies : Supreme Court To Centre, States Allowing the appeal, the judgment authored by Justice Nath observed that the court below had misdirected itself in law by shifting the focus from the requirement of proof of title to the alleged infirmities in the defendant's case. The Court asserted that in the absence of producing any documents proving their title over the temple, the Respondent-plaintiff cannot assert ownership and title merely on account of their supervision and control over the temple administration. 

 

Such an approach is contrary to the settled principles governing adjudication of title suits and cannot be sustained.”, the court observed, pointing out that the appellant-defendant's failure to prove title over the temple would not enure to the respondent-plaintiff's benefit, particularly when no document was shown by them to prove their title over the temple. “A careful examination of the material on record would indicate that the respondent-plaintiffs have failed to produce any document of title evidencing ownership of the suit property in their favour. There is no deed of dedication, no document of endowment, nor any legally admissible evidence to show that the property stood vested in the respondent-society.”, the court observed. In terms of the aforesaid, the appeal was allowed. Cause Title: KISHAN CHAND (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. VERSUS GAUTAM GAUR HITKARAK SABHA, KOTA & ORS. Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 463 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1245 OF 2011

 KISHAN CHAND (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. VERSUS GAUTAM GAUR HITKARAK SABHA, KOTA & ORS. 

 J U D G M E N T

 VIKRAM NATH, J. 1. …

APPELLANT(S) …RESPONDENT(S)

1. Heard Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant, and Shri Ajay Choudhary, learned counsel for the respondents. 

 2. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant- defendant1 against the final judgment dated 28th September, 2007, passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur2, in S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 36 of 1988, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-defendant and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 6th January, 1988, passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 1, Kota3, 1Hereinafter, being referred to as “appellant-defendant”. 2Hereinafter, being referred to as “High Court”. 3Hereinafter, being referred to as “Trial Court”. Page 1 of 11

 3. in Civil Suit No. 36 of 1978, decreeing the suit for injunction and possession filed by the respondents4. Brief facts, essential for the disposal of the present appeal, are as follows: - 

 3.1. The suit was instituted by the respondent-plaintiffs, comprising a registered society and its members. According to the plaint, an ancient temple, namely “Moorti Swarup Shri Govardhan Nath Ji”, situated at Rampura Bazar in Kota town, is the property of the Gurjar Goud Brahmin Rampura Society, Kota, and forms the subject matter of the present suit. It is further averred that the respondent-plaintiffs are entrusted with the management and administration of the temple, including the idols installed therein, along with their ornaments, articles, and other appurtenant properties. For this purpose, the society appoints an individual5 to act as a custodian or caretaker, who manages the affairs of the temple on its behalf. 

 3.2. On 28th October, 1926, a meeting of the respondent plaintiffs was held, wherein it was resolved to appoint one Gordhan Ji as the caretaker of the suit property in place of the previous caretaker, Ganga Bishan Ji, who had expressed his desire to relinquish the 4Hereinafter, being referred to as “respondent-plaintiffs”. 5While the term “Priest” is used in the plaint, it is also interchangeably referred to as “pujari”, “custodian”, “manager” and “caretaker”. Page 2 of 11 position. Pursuant thereto, possession and control of the temple articles were handed over to Gordhan Ji. 

3.3. Subsequently, on 20th June, 1951, Gordhan Ji expressed his inability to continue as caretaker on account of his circumstances, and proposed that the responsibility be entrusted to the present appellant defendant. Accordingly, on 24th June, 1951, the respondent-plaintiffs resolved to appoint the appellant-defendant as the caretaker and handed over the management of the suit property to him. The appellant-defendant was also paid remuneration from the income generated by the shops situated on the suit property. 

 3.4. Thereafter, on 3rd May, 1963, respondent No. 1 came to be registered as a trust with the Devasthan Department, State of Rajasthan, Udaipur. 

3.5. In or about November, 1976, the appellant–defendant asserted ownership over the suit property. In response, respondent No. 1 issued a legal notice calling upon the appellant-defendant to cease acting as the pujari and relinquish control over the temple. 

 3.6. Ultimately, on 3rd October, 1977, a civil suit6 was instituted seeking the removal of the appellant defendant from the position of “pujari” and for restoration of possession and control of the suit 6Civil Suit No. 36 of 1978. Page 3 of 11 property, including the idols, ornaments, agricultural land, and shops of the temple, to the respondent plaintiffs. 

 4. The appellant-defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement, wherein he denied the claim of title asserted by the respondent-plaintiffs over the suit property. It was, inter alia, contended that the suit property was his private property, which had devolved upon him through a line of succession by way of successive adoptions. The averments that the ownership of the property vested in the respondent plaintiffs and that the appellant-defendant or his predecessors were appointed as “pujaris” by the respondent-society were specifically denied. 

 4.1. It was further contended that the suit property had originally been constructed by one Bhagirath Bohra Bamboria, who subsequently donated the same to his son-in-law, Vallabh Ji Mukhiya. Upon the latter dying issueless, he is stated to have adopted one Ganga Bishan Ji, who thereafter inherited the suit property and performed the duties of a “pujari”. Ganga Bishan Ji, in turn, having no issue, is stated to have adopted Gordhan Lal, who assumed the said responsibilities and subsequently adopted the present appellant-defendant, the son of Bhanwar Lal Brahmin. On this basis, the appellant-defendant claimed a continuous line of succession and asserted Page 4 of 11 that he had been performing seva-pooja of the temple over the years. It was also contended that during the years 1939-40, he had raised additional construction on the suit property after obtaining due permission from the District Magistrate. 

4.2. The appellant-defendant further asserted that his predecessor, Gordhan Lal, had executed a Will in his favour, bequeathing the suit property to him upon his death. 

 5. Upon trial, the respondent-plaintiffs examined nine witnesses, whereas the appellant-defendant examined eight witnesses. By judgment dated 6th January, 1988, the Trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs, decreed the suit, and directed the appellant-defendant to hand over possession of the suit property to the respondent-plaintiffs. 

 5.1. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant defendant preferred a first appeal7 before the High Court. 

 5.2. By judgment dated 28th September, 2007, the High Court dismissed the first appeal preferred by the appellant–defendant with costs of Rs. 2,000/-, and affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs. 7S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 36 of 1988. Page 5 of 11 6. 7. 8. 9. The appellant-defendant is, thus, before us. At the outset, it must be noted that the present appeal assails concurrent findings recorded in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs, whereby the Trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment and possession, and the High Court, in appeal, affirmed the said decree. The core issue, therefore, arises for determination is whether the respondent-plaintiffs have successfully established their title to the suit property so as to justify the decree for declaration and removal of the appellant-defendant. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to advert to the reasoning recorded by the courts below while decreeing the suit of the respondent–plaintiffs, which may be summarised as follows: - 

 a. That the predecessors through whom the appellant-defendant claims rights over the suit property were appointed merely as “pujaris” by the respondent-plaintiffs for the purpose of performing seva-pooja, and did not possess any independent proprietary interest therein. 

b. That although the suit property was initially constructed by Bhagirath Ji Bohra Bamboriya, there is no evidence on record to establish that it was subsequently transferred by way of donation Page 6 of 11 by the appellant’s predecessor, Vallabh Ji Mukhiya, to his son-in-law. 

 c. That the appellant-defendant has failed to establish any hereditary right over the management of the suit property, including the alleged chain of successive adoptions, no cogent evidence having been adduced in that regard. 

 d. That the document8 dated 26th October, 1926, bearing the signature of the appellant defendant’s predecessor, Gordhan Ji, indicates that he was appointed as a manager by the representatives of respondent No. 1-society and had acknowledged receipt of the jewellery belonging to the temple deity entrusted to him. Further, a subsequent document9 of the year 1938, also bearing his signature, records the handing over of 16 items of jewellery belonging to the deity by the representatives of respondent No. 1-society. 

 e. That the document10 dated 20th June, 1951, being minutes of a meeting, records that Gordhan Ji expressed his inability to continue managing the suit property on account of old age and ill-health, and that the arrangement be 8Exhibit 5. 9Exhibit 6. 10 Exhibit 8. Page 7 of 11 entrusted to the appellant-defendant on a fixed monthly remuneration. 

 10. From the aforesaid material, the courts below concluded that the suit property belongs to respondent No. 1-society and does not constitute the private property of the appellant-defendant, who was merely appointed as a custodian or “pujari” for the purposes of management and performance of religious duties. The documents were also relied upon to indicate that the respondent-plaintiffs exercised periodic control over the appointment of such “pujaris”. 

 11. It is on the basis of the aforesaid reasoning that the courts below decreed the suit and directed the appellant-defendant to hand over possession of the suit property to the respondent-plaintiffs. 

 12. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be apposite to reiterate the settled principles governing suits for declaration of title. It is trite that in a suit for declaration and consequential relief, the burden lies squarely upon the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title to the suit property. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence. 

 13. This principle has been consistently reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Page 8 of 11 Society Ltd.,11 wherein it was held that “in a suit for declaration of title, the burden is always on the plaintiff to establish his title and he cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendant’s case.”12 

 14. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we find that the entire approach adopted by the courts below suffers from a fundamental infirmity. The courts below have proceeded primarily on the premise that the appellant-defendant and his predecessors were merely “pujaris” appointed by the respondent-society and, therefore, could not claim any independent proprietary interest. However, such a conclusion, by itself, does not discharge the burden cast upon the plaintiffs under Sections 101 and 102 read with Section 110 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to affirmatively establish their own title. 

 15. A careful examination of the material on record would indicate that the respondent-plaintiffs have failed to produce any document of title evidencing ownership of the suit property in their favour. There is no deed of dedication, no document of endowment, nor any legally admissible evidence to show that the property stood vested in the respondent-society. The mere fact that the society exercised certain supervisory or 11 (2014) 2 SCC 269 12 Para 15. Page 9 of 11 managerial functions over the temple or participated in the appointment of “pujaris” would not ipso facto confer title upon it. 

 16. Equally, the reliance placed by the courts below on the documents dated 26th October, 1926 and 20th June, 1951, whereby the appellant-defendant’s predecessor Gordhan Ji and appellant-defendant were appointed as the “pujari”, respectively, in our view, is misplaced. These documents, at best, indicate the nature of management or arrangement pertaining to the temple and its properties. They do not constitute documents of title, nor do they establish vesting of ownership in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs. The distinction between management of a religious institution and ownership of its properties is well recognised in law, and the two cannot be conflated. 

17. The courts below have also rejected the appellant defendant’s claim of succession through adoption on the ground that the same has not been satisfactorily proved. Even assuming that the defendant has failed to conclusively establish his title, the same would not enure to the benefit of the plaintiffs. As noticed hereinabove, the plaintiffs must independently establish their title, failing which the suit must necessarily fail. Page 10 of 11 

18. In the present case, the respondent-plaintiffs have not discharged this burden. Their case rests largely on inferences drawn from management practices and appointment of “pujaris”, which, in law, are insufficient to establish proprietary rights over immovable property. 

 19. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the courts below have misdirected themselves in law by shifting the focus from the requirement of proof of title to the alleged infirmities in the defendant’s case. Such an approach is contrary to the settled principles governing adjudication of title suits and cannot be sustained. 

 20. In view of the aforesaid, the judgment dated 28th September, 2007, passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 36 of 1988, is hereby set aside. 

 21. Consequently, the present appeal stands allowed and the suit is dismissed. 

 22. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of. ………………………………..J. [VIKRAM NATH] ………………………………..J. [SANDEEP MEHTA] NEW DELHI; APRIL 09, 2026 Page 11 of 1