2022 ജൂൺ 23, വ്യാഴാഴ്‌ച

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/justice-chandrachud-growing-litigious-trend-country-indicates-lack-patience-political-discourse-court-constitution-202010

Highlighting that the Courts cannot be a "one stop solution" to resolve complicated issues of society and policy, Supreme Court judge Justice DY Chandrachud said that a democratic society must resolve issues through public deliberation, discourse and the engagement of citizens with their representatives and the Constitution

"The use of the court as the first line of defence to solve complicated social issues is a reflection of the waning power of discourse and consensus building. If we allow our local laws, institutions and practices to be co-opted by the forces of racism, casteism and discrimination, all our social problems will have to be taken out of deliberative fora and placed before the court", Justice Chandrachud said.

"The growing litigious trend in the country is indicative of the lack of patience in the political discourse. This results in a slippery slope where courts are regarded as the only organ of the State for realization of rights- obviating the need for continuous engagement with the legislature and the executive", he added.

Justice Chandrachud made these comments as the closing remarks of the lecture delivered by him at the King's College in London on the topic "Protecting human rights and preserving civil liberties: The role of courts in a democracy".

While saying that the Supreme Court must protect the fundamental rights of the citizens, he cautioned that it "must not transcend its role by deciding issues requiring the involvement of elected representatives". Doing so would not only be a deviation from the Court's constitutional role but would not serve a democratic society, which at its core, must resolve issues through public deliberation, discourse and the engagement of citizens with their representatives and the Constitution.

"Refining our rights rhetoric to include participative processes and as well as substantive outcomes is one step towards recognising the complementary roles the political and legal spheres of the Constitution play in protecting our human rights. The fulfillment of the ideals of our Constitution and the protections guaranteed under it cannot only be achieved by exercising our role as citizens once every five years. There must be a continuous engagement with all the pillars of democracy", Justice Chandrachud said while concluding his lecture.

In his lecture, he elaborately discussed various judgments through which the Supreme Court played a central role in the realization of constitutional goals and the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizens.

"Would the country's social, political, and economic status have been the same but for the Supreme Court's interventions? The debate in individual cases aside, the answer to the question is in the negative", he remarked during the lecture.

Saying that "gender" has been an important subject with which the Supreme Court has engaged, the judge spoke at length about various judgments on gender rights.

"With the changing times however, the Supreme Court has attempted to move beyond manifest forms of discrimination and has engaged with the binary division of gender into men and women, gendered notions of certain professions, and discrimination on the basis of gender- in the workplace, within the confines of one's homes, or in the society, among others", he said.

Justice Chandrachud discussed the judgments in Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (where the prohibition on employment of women in liquor shops was struck down), Babita Puniya v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence(where women were declared eligible for permanent commission in armed forces), Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India(where the criteria for permanent commission for women was found to be furthering indirect discrimination), Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh (where the concept of intersectional discrimniation involving caste, gender and disability was discussed).

The judgments of the Supreme Court in NALSA and Navtej Johar cases on LGBTQ rights were also discussed.

"The struggles of the LGBTQ community have found a voice in the courts. The members of the LGBTQ community have lived, thrived, endured and loved through the beginning of time. In the face of stigma and prejudice, many have been forced to live their lives closeted from the "straight" society. In turn, they have created their own communities, found liberation in solidarity as they together resisted the heteronormative order and have crafted their own language of "being" when the labels that the society gave them fell short of the diversity that they had to offer to the world. LGBTQ liberation movements are gaining momentum today in India and have achieved certain legal milestones", he said.

Justice Chandrachud mentioned that in 2019, the Botswana High Court declared a law criminalising same sex relations as unconstitutional by relying heavily on Navtej Johar. He said that it is encouraging to note that the Indian High Courts post the decision in Navtej Johar have started recognizing romantic relationships between the queer women and granting them protection. 

Justice Chandrachud also referred to judgments on disability rights. In Vikas Kumar v. UPSC, the Court held that an individual suffering from writer's cramp is entitled to the provision of a scribe for appearing in Civil Services Examination. In Ravindra Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, the Court addressed workplace discrimination against persons with mental health conditions and interfered with the disciplinary proceedings initiated against a person suffering from mental disability.

"Cases such as Ravindra Kumar Dhariwal give us an insight into how discrimination may stem from a number of factors and is fluid", he said.

The recent judgments emphasizing the need for a proper assessment of character antecedents and mitigating circumstances in death penalty cases and recognizing the rights of sex workers were also discussed.

"All of these instances and more show the path that the Indian Supreme Court has taken to protect human rights and civil liberties for different sections of the society in a democracy", he said.

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/maharashtra-political-crisis-plea-in-supreme-court-seeks-to-ban-mlas-who-defect-or-resign-from-elections-for-5-years-202126

Amidst the political crisis unfolding in Maharashtra, an application has been filed in the Supreme Court seeking to restrain the MLAs who are disqualified or have resigned from contesting elections upto five years from the date of their resignation or disqualification.

The relief has been sought in a new application filed in a pending writ petition preferred by Congress Leader Jaya Thakur wherein she had prayed for debarring candidates disqualified as members of the House under the Xth Schedule of the Constitution from re-contesting by-elections during the term of the House to which they were elected.
The Supreme Court had issued notice in Thakur's writ petition in January 2021. Now, in the wake of the political crisis in Maharashtra, she has moved a fresh interlocutory application in the writ petition, stating that the Central Government and the Election Commission of India has not so far filed their counter-affidavits in the mater though notice was issued to them on January 7, 2021.
"The political parties taking disadvantage of this situation and continuously destroying the Elected Govt. in various State of our Country. Recently, 18.06.2022 to 22.06.2022 same thing are repeated in State of Maharashtra. These political parties again try to destroying the Democratic Fabric of our country. Therefore immediately direction of this Hon'ble Court is necessary as prayed in this application for direction," the application states.
Thakur in her application has further stated that of late there has been a concerted pan India effort by political parties to render the provisions of the Xth Schedule of the Constitution otiose and redundant.
Citing various instances of MLA's being disqualified or resigning in various states such as Manipur, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Thakur has also contended in her application that these undemocratic practices are making mockery of our democracy and the Constitution.
"The result is that due to this, people of the State are denied stability and the Voters are denied their right to choose and elect representative having a common ideology. Moreover these constant defections cause huge loss to the public exchequer which is involved in the conduct of bye elections," application also states.
Therefore, the applicant seeks  change in the present law which allows such MLAs to contest by-polls during the term of the existing assembly. She cites the example of Karnataka, where many MLAs who resigned in 2019 got re-elected to the same assembly in bypolls.
The application has been drafted by Advocate Varun Thakur and has been filed by AOR Varinder Kumar Sharma.
Case Title: Jaya Thakur v UOI| WP 1032 of 2020


https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/s-311-crpc-witness-cant-be-recalled-merely-because-he-gave-a-different-statement-in-another-case-relating-to-same-incident-supreme-court-202146

The Supreme Court has held that "merely because a different statement was given by the same prosecution witness in another case relating to the same incident, that itself would not be a reason for recalling the witness under section 311, Cr. P. C." 

The petitioner is facing trial in a murder case. In 2014, during the trial, one prosecution witness named Naushad gave a statement that he had identified the petitioner as one of the assailants carrying rifle. Relating to the crime, the petitioner was facing another trial under the Gangsters Act. In the proceedings under the Gangsters Act, the same witness Naushad gave a statement in 2021 that he could not identify the petitioner as one of the assailants as he was wearing a cloth over his face. Relying on the second statement given by the witness in 2021, the petitioner sought to recall him as a witness in the first trial. The trial court rejected this application and the High Court affirmed the rejection. In this backdrop, he approached the Supreme Court.

Affirming the trial court's view, the Supreme Court bench of Justices Ravikumar and Dhulia proceeded to assert, "The trial court has rejected this application and in our view rightly so, for the reasons that merely because a different statement given by the same prosecution witness in another case that itself would not be a reason for recalling the witness and that too, after a period of seven years."

The bench added, "It is not a case where a contradictory statement was given by some other witnesses in the present trial."
The bench noted that the petitioner/accused has relied upon the judgment of the top court in Sudevanand v. State Through Central Bureau of Investigation (2012) , contending that under the similar circumstances, the Court had allowed the recalling of a witness under section 311. Distinguishing the case, the bench observed, "However, we do not agree with the same. The case relied upon by the petitioner/accused, that is, in Sudevanand's case (supra) is on an entirely different factual matrix. In the said case, the witness had given two different versions that is one before the trial court and the different one before the Inquiry Commission, where he had turned into an approver...Therefore, in our view the reliance by the petitioner on the above decision is entirely misplaced."
The bench then passed the following order- "Under these circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the order impugned passed by the High Court. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed."
Section 311 of the Cr. P. C. provides the 'Power to summon material witness, or examine person present'- "Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re- examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re- examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case"
Case Title: SAUD FAISAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
Citation : 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 556
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 311 -M erely because a different statement given by the same prosecution witness in another case that itself would not be a reason for recalling the witness

Click Here To Read/Download Order



2022 ജൂൺ 21, ചൊവ്വാഴ്ച

Kerala High CourtAyana Charitable Trust vs State Of Kerala on 6 January, 2017


        

 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                         PRESENT:

                    THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN
                                        &
                      THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK MENON

                THURSDAY, THE 31ST DAY OF MAY 2018 / 10TH JYAISHTA, 1940

                              WP(C).No. 35835 of 2016
                             ------------------------




PETITIONERS:
-----------


1    AYANA CHARITABLE TRUST
     (HITHERTO GOSPEL FOR ASIA),
     MANJADI P.O., THIRUVALLA,
     PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT,
     KERALA STATE, REPRESENTED BY SMT.SINY PUNNOOSE,
     MANAGING TRUSTEE AND CHIEF FUNCTIONARY THROUGH
     HER POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER AND GENERAL
     ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CHURCH, JACOB POTHEN,
     AGED 57, S/O.LATE POTHEN, THERADIYIL HOUSE,
     NIRANAM WEST MURI, NIRANAM VILLAGE,
     THIRUVALLA TALUK

2    JACOB C.PHILIP
     S/O.LATE C.V.PHILIP,
     GENERAL MANAGER, BC CHERUVALLY ESTATE,
     ERUMELY SOUTH P.O.,
     ERUMELY SOUTH VILLAGE, KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK,
     KOTTAYAM DISTRICT.


     BY ADVS.SRI.CHERIAN GEE VARGHESE
             SRI.P.HARIDAS
             SMT.DIVYA K.NAIR
             SMT.ROSHIN MARIAM JACOB
             SRI.P.C.SHIJIN
             SRI.RENJI GEORGE CHERIAN




RESPONDENTS:
------------

1.   STATE OF KERALA
     REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY,
     DEPARTMENT OF HOME,
     GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
     THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN: 695 001.
WP(C).No. 35835 of 2016 (D)                  ::2::

2.     DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
       PIN: 695 001.

3.      DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF
        KOTTAYAM, PIN: 686 001.

4.      DY. S.P.KANJIRAPPALLY, PIN; 686 001.


5.      THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, ERUMELI
        PIN: 686 543.

6.      THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, MANIMALA, PIN: 686 543.


7.      THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
        ERUMELI (SHO), PIN: 686 543.

8.      THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
        ERUMELI (SHO), PIN: 686 543.

9.      CHIEF INSPECTOR OF PLANTATIONS
        RUBBER BOARD, KOTTAYAM, PIN: 686 001.

10.     JOINT REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER
        KOTTAYAM, PIN:686 001.

*11.     INSPECTOR OF PLANTATIONS
        RUBBER BOARD, KOTTAYAM, PIN: 686 001.[DELETED]

*12.     GEETHANANDAN
        RESIDING WITH, SELVARAJ,
        MANDATHOMMOTTIL HOUSE,
        THENMALA VILLAGE, PUNALUR TALUK,
        KOLLAM, PIN: 691 501.[DELETED]

*13.   SELVARAJ M.K
      S/O.KUNJAPPY,
      MANDATHOMMOTHIL HOUSE,
      THENMALA VILLAGE, PUNALUR TALUK,
      PI: 691 501.[DELETED]
[RESPONDENTS R11 TO R13 ARE DELETED FROM
      THE PARTY ARRAY AS PER THE ORDER DATED 06.01.2017 IN IA
      20733/16.]

14.     RAJESH K.R
        S/O.RAJAPPAN, AGED 39, 5TH COLONY,
        B.C CHERUVALLY ESTATE, KANAKAPALAM.PIN 686 543

15.     RAMESHAN.E.S.
        S/O.SIVANKUTTY, ELIAGATTUATHOPPIL HOUSE,
        CHENAPPADY POST, ERUMELI.PIN 686 543

16.     PRASAD E.G S/O.E.G.JENARDHANAN,
        EDATHARAYILD HOUSE,
        4TH COLONY, B.C.CHERUVALLY ESTATE,
        KANAKAPALAM POST, ERUMELI 686 509
WP(C).No. 35835 of 2016 (D)               ::3::


17.   PRABHAKARAN N.S
      S/O.RAMANSREEDHARAN,
      NIVARATHIL HOUSE, KAMBILAYAM, B.C.CHERUVALLY ESTATE.686 509

18.   SASI
      S/O.RAGHAVAN,
      VETTIKATTUTHAZHA HOUSE 4TH COLONY,
      B.C.CHERUVALLY ESTATE, ERUMELI 686 543.

19.   P.P.VIJAYAN,
      S/O.PAPPU, PATHIKAVIL,
      KAMILAYAM, B.C.CHERUVALLY ESTATE,
      KANAKAPALAM, KANAKAPALAM, KANJIRAPPALLY,
      PIN: 686 509.

20.   M.P.SASI
      S/O.K.P.BALAN,
      NO.5TH COLONY,
      B.C.CHERUVALLY ESTATE, KANAKAPALAM, ERUMELI 686 544

21.   V.C.KRISHNANKUTTY
      S/O.LINE ROOM NO.75,
      ROOM NO.2, 6TH COLONY CHERUVALLY DIVISION,
      CHERUVALLY ESTATE, KANAKAPALAM POST,
      ERUMELI - 686 543.

22.   ARUN PRAKASH
      S/O.D.VASU, STORE COLONY,
      LINE NO.82.B.C.CHERUVALLY ESTATE,
      ERUMELI 686 543.

23.   SALIM
      KUNNAM COLONY, LINE NO.87, ROOM NO.6
      B.C.CHERUVALLY ESTATE,
      KANAKAPALAM POST (VIA) ERUMELI, KOTTAYAM DIST
      686 509.

        R1-R8 BY SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI P P THAJUDDIN


    THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 31-05-2018,
THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C).No. 35835 of 2016 (D)              ::4::

                                      APPENDIX

PETITIONER(S)' EXHIBITS

EXT.P1           TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WPC NO.10917/2009
                 DATED 1/6/2009.

EXT.P2           TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 29/9/2015

EXT.P3           TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 24/10/2016

EXT.P4           TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED 2/11/2016

EXT.P5           TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 7/11/2016


RESPONDENTS EXHIBITS: NIL




                                         TRUE COPY




                                         P.A TO JUDGE



jma

         K. VINOD CHANDRAN & ASHOK MENON, JJ
            -----------------------------------
                        W.P(C) No. 35835 of 2016 D
            - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                  Dated this the 31st day of May, 2018


                               JUDGMENT

Vinod Chandran, J The petitioners were before this Court against the alleged illegal activities carried on by the party respondents and persons under them putting into danger the managerial staff and willing workers of the petitioner, obstruction caused to the the ingress and egress into the estate owned by the petitioner as also encroachment and destruction of the properties.

2. Writ petition itself was filed in the year 2016. On 08.11.2016 a Division Bench of this Court passed the following order:

In CRM-M-39657 of 2020-PUNJ HC- In absence of substantive material against accused in NDPS case, mere call records unaccompanied by transcript of conversations between co-accused not corroborative material: P&H HCJustice Vikas Bahl [06-04-2022]

Chandigarh, April 11, 2022: While dealing with an NDPS Act case where the State opposed bail plea of the accused on the ground of availability of call records between the petitioners and other co-accused based on whose disclosure statement the petitioners were arrayed as accused, the Punjab and Haryana High Court echoed the law propounded by Supreme Court and Gujarat High Court which says that without the transcript of the conversations exchanged between the co-accused, mere call details would not be considered to be corroborative material in absence of substantive material found against the accused.

By virtue of this order, the Bench of Justice Vikas Bahl disposed of three criminal miscellaneous applications filed under Section 439 Cr.P.C. for grant of regular bail in an FIR registered under provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). 

The case of the petitioners primarily was that the alleged recovery of contraband was effected from two persons (namely Rakesh Sharma and Ravdeep Singh @ Sheru) and not from the present petitioners. It was further contended that the petitioners were apprehended solely on the ground of a disclosure statement made by the above-named persons. It was also argued that even subsequent to the disclosure statement, no recovery was effected from the petitioners. Lastly, while submitting that the trial was going to take time owing examination of single prosecution witness out of the total 32, the Counsel sought grant of bail. 

On the contrary, the State Counsel opposed the present petition for regular bail while submitting that there were call details of conversations exchanged between the three petitioners and the two co-accused (Rakesh Sharma and Ravdeep Singh @Sheru, from whom the recovery was effected.

On the aspect of call records between the petitioner and the other accused, the Counsel for the the petitioner furnished a rebuttal which was to the effect that as per the affidavit and report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., there were no details regarding the date on which the alleged calls were exchanged and at any rate, there was no transcript of the said call details. Further, to substantiate this argument, the Counsel relied upon Narcotics Control Bureau Vs. Sandeep [P&H HC] and Yash Jayeshbhai Champaklal Shah Vs. State of Gujarat, [Gujarat HC], to contend that where there are no recordings of conversations exchanged between the accused, then the same cannot be treated as corroborative material in absence of substantive material found against the accused. 

Reliance was also placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Bharat Chaudhary Vs. Union of India, to argue that reliance placed on WhatsApp messages cannot be treated as sufficient material to establish a live link between the accused in the case when most of the scientific reports with respect to the said evidence are still awaited. 

The Court, at the very outset reiterated the undisputed facts of the matter as pleaded in the case advanced by the petitioner’s. Further, the Court also noted that the petitioners were behind bars since November 2020 and that in light of the 32 non-examined prosecution witness the Trial was going to be prolonged. 

Further, addressing the argument of the petitioner’s counsel on the non-availability of transcript of the call records, the Court opined that no dates on which the said calls were allegedly made by the co-accused to the petitioners or vice-versa were mentioned in the affidavit or in the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and that the transcript of the said conversations were not a part of the record under Section 173 Cr.P.C.

Thus, in view view of the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court in Yash Jayeshbhai Champaklal Shah and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Narcotics Control Bureau Vs. Sandeep, which was to the effect that without the transcript of the conversations exchanged between the co-accused, mere call details would not be considered to be corroborative material in absence of substantive material found against the accused, the Court noted that in the present case there was no other material against the petitioners. 

Thus, keeping in view the above-said facts and circumstances, as well as law laid down in the judgments noticed herein above, the present petitions were allowed and the petitioners were ordered to be released on bail on their furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate and subject to their not being required in any other case.

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/right-to-information-act-vigilance-department-exemption-orissa-high-court-202003

In a significant decision, the Orissa High Court has held that the Vigilance Department of the State cannot be completely exempted from the operation of the Right to Information Act, 2005 ('RTI'). It directed that information pertaining to allegations of corruption and human rights violations and also information pertaining to activities undertaken by the Department, which are not sensitive or confidential, should be disclosed under the RTI.

A Division Bench of Chief Justice Dr. S. Muralidhar and Justice Radha Krishna Pattanaik observed,

"Thus, it is seen that what cannot be kept outside the purview of disclosure under the RTI Act as spelt out in the proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act is information pertaining to "allegations of corruption and human rights violations" in both sub-categories of cases as noted hereinbefore viz., cases generally concerning allegations of corruption and human rights violations which are under investigation by or have been investigated by the concerned intelligence and security organisations established by the State Government' or cases concerning allegations of corruption and human rights violations involving those working for or employed by the said organisations established by the State Government."

Brief Facts:

Three writ petitions, each filed by way of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), involved challenges to the notification dated 11th August 2016 issued by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Information and Public Relations Department, Government of Odisha under Section 24(4) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The said notification provided that "nothing contained in the RTI Act shall apply to the General Administration (Vigilance) Department of the Government of Odisha and its organization".

Contentions of the Petitioners:

The main ground of challenge to the impugned notification was that it violates Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution which guarantees to all citizens the fundamental right to information. It was submitted that under the RTI Act, disclosure is the norm and refusal of information is the exception.

Referring to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act and, in particular, to the proviso thereto, it was contended that the power of exemption granted to the State Government thereunder is not available even in the case of intelligence and security organizations where the allegations pertain to corruption and human rights violations. Therefore, inasmuch as the impugned notification seeks to exempt the entire Vigilance Department in Odisha from the purview of the RTI Act, irrespective of the proviso to Section 24(4), it is ultra vires Section 24(4).

It was also submitted that by the impugned notification the Government intends to keep away from disclosure to the public, instances of corruption and human right violations, notwithstanding the proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act. It was further submitted that the notification issued under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act or even the Rules made under Section 28 of the RTI Act cannot exceed the scope of the restriction under Section 24 of the RTI Act. The Rules and the notifications are meant to carry out the provisions of the RTI Act and not whittle down or take away what is guaranteed by the RTI Act, they added. They further alleged that the impugned notification imposes a restriction not envisaged under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act.

Contentions of the Respondents:

Mr. Sailaza Nandan Das, Additional Standing Counsel for the State of Odisha and Mr. Srimanta Das, Senior Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department submitted that if the Department were not to be exempted from the purview of the RTI Act then all kinds of information regarding the functioning of the said Department would become available to the public and that would be against the interests of the security and public interest.

Specific reference was made to the fact that under Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act, information that is otherwise to be made available only under the orders of the Court like the information under Section 91 read with Section 311 of Cr.P.C. or under Section 162 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 123 thereof, would become easily available to an applicant and this in turn might impede the progress of investigation or the prosecution of the case and delay the trials.

The State Vigilance Department contended that revealing confidential information under the RTI Act to an individual, or an organization or even an aggrieved person at any stage would impede the entire process of an enquiry into corruption. It was argued that Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act does not adequately cover the confidential process which is undertaken in order to build up an enquiry against a corrupt person.

Further, it was stressed that the first proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act regarding allegations of corruption and human rights violation is in an entirely a different context and should not be misconstrued as information regarding corruption which is under investigation. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in S. Vijayalakshmi v. Union of India, AIR 2011 Mad 275.

They also highlighted the fact that the Allahabad High Court in its order dated 25th October, 2010 in Saleem Baig v. State of U.P. and the Madras High Court in Superintendent of Police v. M. Kannappan, (2013) 1 MLJ 348 had upheld the constitutional validity of a similar notifications under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act keeping their respective Vigilance Departments out of the purview of the RTI Act and held it not to be ultra vires the RTI Act.

Therefore, it was submitted that if the Vigilance Department is not exempted from the scope of the RTI Act, it would frustrate the intent of the legislature while inserting Section 8(b) of the RTI Act. While highlighting the possible repercussions, it was contended that even under Section 172 of the Cr.P.C., an accused does not have a right to seek to see the Case Diary whereas in the absence of the impugned notification such statements may become easily available under the RTI Act.

Relying on the decision in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner, (2013) 1 SCC 212, it was submitted that protection from the "probing eyes of outsiders" needs to be provided to vigilance officers in performing their duties. The performance of an employee in an organisation is a matter between the employee and employer which would be governed under service rules falling under "personal information" under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, they added. It was also submitted that the Government issued the impugned notification after receiving representations from the Vigilance Department that they were facing difficulties due to queries raised under the RTI Act.

Court's Observations:

The Court held that first proviso is an important check on the above power of the State Government. It specifically states that information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded under sub-section (4) of section 24 of the RTI Act. According to the Bench, there could be at least two broad sub-categories here, viz.

  • cases generally concerning allegations of corruption and human rights violations which are under investigation by or have been investigated by the concerned 'intelligence and security organisations, being organisations established by the State Government'; and
  • cases concerning allegations of corruption and human rights violations involving those working for or employed by the concerned 'intelligence and security organisations, being organisations established by the State Government'.

The Court did not accept the plea of the opposite parties that the information that stands protected from disclosure under Section 8 of the RTI Act will straightway become available to an applicant in the absence of the impugned notification under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act. The Court observed that Section 8 of the RTI Act opens with a non-obstante clause. The other factor is that the category of information that is highlighted in the first proviso to Section 24(1) and Section 24(4) of the RTI Act viz., "information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations" is not found mentioned as such in Section 8 of the RTI Act. Thus, what stands protected by Section 8 of the RTI Act would remain as such and additionally when such information pertains to allegations of corruption and human rights violations, the proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act would have to be considered as well.

Further, it was noted, the second proviso under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act provides a second layer of protection to a public servant, when it states that the information sought in respect of the allegations of violation of human rights shall be only be provided "after the approval of the State Information Commission". Therefore, it is not as if such information would be straightway made available to a person seeking such information. In processing the request by an applicant seeking information regarding violation of human rights or involving corruption, regard will be had to Section 8 of the RTI Act. That is the true purport of the non obstante clause at the beginning of Section 8 of the RTI Act. In effect, therefore, there is no conflict between Section 8 on the one hand and the proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act on the other, it held.

Thus, as regards the process to be adopted in dealing with the applications under the proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act, inasmuch as Section 8 of the RTI Act opens with a non-obstante clause, if the information sought is covered thereunder it can be disclosed after satisfying the requirements of Section 8 of the RTI Act with regard being had to the true purport of the proviso Section 24(4), the Court observed.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the impugned notification in so far as it seeks to exempt the entire Vigilance Department of the Government from the view of the RTI Act would run counter to the first proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act. "In other words, the notification insofar as it prevents disclosure of information concerning the General Administration (Vigilance) Department even when it pertains to allegations of corruption and human rights violations would be contrary to the first proviso to Section 2 (4) of the RTI act and, by that yardstick, would be unsustainable in law. If under the RTI Act disclosure is the norm, and non-disclosure the exception, then the impugned notification seeks to take away what is provided by the RTI Act and is therefore ultra vires the RTI Act", it added.

Consequently, the Court issued a declaratory writ to the effect that the impugned notification dated 11th August, 2016 issued by the Information and Public Relations Department, Government of Odisha under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act, will not permit the Government to deny information pertaining to the Vigilance Department involving allegations of corruption and human rights violations, and other information that does not touch upon any of the sensitive and confidential activities undertaken by the Vigilance Department. It also directed that a further clarificatory notification to the above effect be issued by the Government of Odisha within four weeks.

Case Title: Subash Mohapatra & Ors. v. State of Odisha & Anr.

Case No.: W.P.(C) No. 14286 of 2016

Judgment Dated: 20th June 2022

Coram: Dr. S. Muralidhar, CJ. & Radha Krishna Pattanaik, J.

Judgment Authored By: Dr. S. Muralidhar, CJ.

Counsel for the Petitioners: Mr. S.P. Das, Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents: Mr. Sailaza Nandan Das, Additional Standing Counsel (for the State) & Mr. Srimanta Das, Senior Standing Counsel (for the Vigilance Department)

Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Ori) 104

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment 

https://t.me/SupremeCourtJudgments/1412


2022 ജൂൺ 19, ഞായറാഴ്‌ച

Child has a right to access both parents’SC was hearing petition of a father

The Supreme Court stepped into the shoes of children who find themselves in the middle of custody battles between estranged parents, saying a child is happiest when he or she can have both parents.

The top court was hearing an appeal from Rajasthan where the Family Court had rejected the father’s plea for interim custody of his minor son in July 2021. The State High Court had dismissed his appeal.

In an order in which the COVID-19 pandemic features prominently, a Bench led by Justice Indira Banerjee said the lower courts’ orders could not be faulted. But the SC then went on to carve several occasions, such as the son’s birthdays, weekends, and summer vacations, during which the father could meet and spend time with him.

“The child would perhaps be happiest if he could have both his parents. Unfortunately, the parents are unable to resolve their differences and stay together. Be that as it may, the child has a right to access both parents, and get the love and affection of both parents. The child cannot be denied the company of his father,” the top court explained.

The issue of custody and access to the child could also resume before the Family Court as “the COVID-19 situation in the country has improved”, the court said.

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